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RETALIATORY DISCHARGE OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL:
A CAUSE OF ACTION-ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS v.
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
INTRODUCTION
[A lawyer] stands "as a shield" ... in defense of right and to ward
off wrong. From a profession charged with such responsibilities
there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high
sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been
compendiously described as "moral character."'
The creation of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge of in-house
counsel would serve to promote and preserve the image of attorneys
possessing "moral character." Attorneys often find themselves in situ-
ations where they must follow their ethical obligations rather than the
wishes of their client. Under these circumstances, when an attorney
refuses to engage in unethical activity, the client traditionally has had
the power to discharge its attorney at will.2 Until recently, the at-will
employment doctrine applied equally to attorneys in private practice,
as well as to corporate attorneys, otherwise known as in-house coun-
sel. The consequences of being discharged, however, are quite differ-
ent for an in-house counsel as opposed to the traditional lawyer.3 The
increased pressures of work, family and society often make living up
to the ideal "moral character," as described by Justice Frankfurter, a
serious challenge for in-house counsel on account of their complete
dependence upon their employer and only client, the corporation. 4
The ability of the client to discharge his attorney at-will is depen-
dent upon trust and protected communications between the attorney
and the client without which no attorney-client relationship should ex-
ist. An extension of the retaliatory discharge cause of action to in-
house counsel affects the basic foundations of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. Such effects occur primarily because the conflict comes
down to a struggle between an in-house counsel's fiduciary duty to the
1. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. See infra notes 7-30 and accompanying text (discussing at-will employment and retaliatory
discharge).
3. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the role of in-house counsel).
4. Schware, 353 U.S. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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client and the counsel's duty to follow the legal profession's ethical
rules of responsibility. A client may ask an attorney to act in a man-
ner which violates his or her code of professional conduct. If the at-
torney's refusal to violate the code results in the attorney's discharge,
fiduciary duties owed to the client have traditionally been held to pro-
hibit a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 5 However, due to the
unique position held by the in-house attorney, some courts have found
grounds which override this potential conflict and concluded that the
in-house counsel has a claim for retaliatory discharge. 6 In Section I,
this Comment will address the doctrine of at-will employment and re-
taliatory discharge. This section will also define the role of in-house
counsel in the twentieth century, as well as describe the attorney-cli-
ent privilege and attorney-client confidentiality. Additionally, in Sec-
tion I, this Comment will examine those cases both accepting and
rejecting retaliatory discharge as a cause of action available to in-
house counsel. Finally, in Section II, this Comment will analyze
whether a cause of action for retaliatory discharge should exist for in-
house counsel. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that a retaliatory
discharge cause of action should extend to in-house counsel. The con-
flict between fiduciary and ethical duties, when it does exist, is secon-
dary to the need to create a remedy for in-house attorneys who follow
their ethical obligations. As the number of companies bringing attor-
neys in-house continues to grow, courts should fashion a rule which
protects ethical in-house attorneys while not allowing unethical clients
(corporations) to go unpunished.
I. BACKGROUND
A. At-Will Employees and Retaliatory Discharge
The common law doctrine of employment at-will guarantees that in
the absence of a contract for a specified period of time, an employ-
ment relationship may be terminated at any time by either the em-
ployer or the employee. 7 At-will employment is a judge-made
doctrine of American origin.8 In its traditional form, the doctrine of
5. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 1043 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
6. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
7. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (I11. 978); Robinson v. Christopher Greater
Area Rural Health Planning Corp., 566 N.E.2d 768, 771 (I11. App. Ct. 1991); see also MACK A.
PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCIMINATION LAW 2 (1988) (stating that under the "American Rule"
unless an agreement by the parties to the contrary existed, the employment relationship is at-will
and can be terminated by either party for any or no reason).
8. ANDREW HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL EM-
PLOYMENT DOCTRINE 11-12 (1987). Most industrial nations do not follow the theory of at-will
employment. Id. Countries such as Canada, France, Great Britain and Japan all require "good
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at-will employment allows an employer to discharge an employee "for
good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without
being thereby guilty of legal wrong." 9 Underlying the fundamental
tenet of employment law is the principle of "mutuality of obligation:
if the employee is free to quit at any time, then the employer must be
free to dismiss at any time."'10 The development of the doctrine of at-
will employment is largely attributable to an 1877 treatise by Horace
Gray Wood, Master and Servant, that set forth a contract paradigm for
employment relationships." H.G. Wood wrote in his treatise:
cause" before terminating the employment relationship. Id. A good example is France, where
the principle of abus de droit, or "abuse of right," is the law. Clyde W. Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 510 (1976). Abus
de droit makes "an employer.., liable for abusive termination of a contract of employment if he
act[s] with malicious intent, culpable negligence, or capriciousness." Id. Damages are the only
remedy, and the action protects an employee from dismissal for illness, political beliefs, exercis-
ing rights of citizenship or "purely personal dislike of the employee." Id. Since the 1800's, how-
ever, state and federal courts in the United States have presumed that employees can be
terminated at-will. Sara A. Corello, In-House Counsel's Right To Sue For Retaliatory Discharge,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 389, 390 (1992); see also United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. General
Elec. Co., 127 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. D.C. 1954) (holding that the employer's right to employ and
discharge whom ever he or she pleases, absent any statutory or contractual provision, is unques-
tioned); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (I11. 985) (holding that an employer
may discharge an employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason at all); Palmateer v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ill. 1981) (holding that an employee has a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge based on public policy); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42
N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (holding that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at-
will); see generally ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, 3A EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 117.20 (1991) (presenting a historical background on the employment at-will doctrine).
9. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Wis. 1983) (quoting Payne v. West-
ern & Atlantic R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 507, 518-20 (1884)).
10. Summers, supra note 8, at 484-85. One 19th century court stated:
May I not refuse to trade with any one? May I not forbid my family to trade with any
one? May I not dismiss my domestic servant for dealing, or even visiting, where I
forbid? And if my domestic, why not my farm-hand, or my mechanic, or teamster? ...
All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no
cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (quoting Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. (13 Lea)
507, 518-20 (1884)).
11. See HILL, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON TlE LAW OF MASTER
AND SERVANT (1877)). In the time prior to Horace Gray Wood's treatise, relations between
employers and employees were covered by the law of masters and servants. Id. at 3-4. In H.G.
Wood's era, economic conditions were changing rapidly and employers depended on the free-
dom to hire and fire workers as they pleased. Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Reme-
dies for Wrongful Discharge in the Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or
Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S.D. L. REV. 63, 66-67 (1988). As one commentator noted: "[Tihe
at-will rule was ideally suited to an economy that was rapidly industrializing." Note, Protecting
Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1931, 1933 (1983). A majority of United States courts adopted H.G. Wood's reasoning without
question during these early years of industrial development and laissez-faire economics. Yon-
over, supra, at 67. The attractiveness of the doctrine "paralleled the growing acceptance of free-
dom-of-contract ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." Note, supra, at
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With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof ....
[It is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either
party, and in this respect there is no distinction between domestic
and other servants.12
The doctrine achieved constitutional approval in the United States in
1908.13
Today, the United States Supreme Court no longer grants the at-
will employment rule unfettered constitutional protection. 14 Since the
1950's, courts and legislatures have created an exception to traditional
at-will employment that restricts an employer's ability to discharge
employees. 15 Currently, an employer may be subject to a lawsuit for
1933. Despite this, different arguments exist regarding the origin of the at-will employment doc-
trine. One line of argument suggests that at-will employment has its roots in the freedom of
contract. Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Termi-
nate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-25 (1980). Another argues that at-will
employment came about as a necessary element of the emerging capitalist society, one that
shifted the burden of business cycles from employers to employees. Jay M. Friedman, The De-
velopment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 118, 118 (1976). As noted
above, the final suggestion is that H.G. Wood's treatise is the basis for at-will employment, even
though such a position is supported by neither legitimate precedent nor any policy justification.
Id. at 126-27. The reason that at-will employment became the rule is because "a modem, com-
prehensive treatise stating a clear rule of practical application would almost inevitably attract a
wide following and be cited as authority." Id. at 127.
12. Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time For an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54
BROOK L. REV. 1137, 1141 (1989) (citing H.G. Wood, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER
AND SERVANT § 134 (1877)). Commentators generally agree that H.G. Wood's analysis was not
supported by the cited authorities. See, e.g., Yonover, supra note 11, at 67 (pointing out that
Wood's reliance upon the following four United States cases was seriously misplaced, as none
furnish firm support for his approach to general hiring: Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich.
115 (1871); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl.
462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1872); and DeBriar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450
(1851)).
13. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 24 (1915) (holding that statutes limiting an employer's
right to discharge were an unconstitutional infringement of the freedom of contract); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175-76 (1908) (invalidating federal legislation forbidding employers
to require employees to agree not join a union).
14. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (resulting in an end to
constitutional at-will employment status with the demise of substantive economic due process by
holding that the Constitution does not protect an employer's freedom to contract with its em-
ployees on whatever terms it desires); Steven S. Gensler, Wrongful Discharge For In-House At-
torneys? Holding the Line Against Lawyers' Self-Interest, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 515, 519-20
(discussing the end of constitutional at-will employment status).
15. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (prohibiting
employment decisions based on race, gender, sex, religion, and national origin); National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988) (providing that employees cannot be fired for their
involvement in union activities and granting employees the right to collectively bargain for em-
ployment contracts-a right by which valuable job security guarantees can be procured);
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959) (upholding suit for wrongful discharge).
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retaliatory discharge if that employer discharges an employee in retal-
iation for the employee's activities, and the discharge contravenes a
clearly mandated public policy. 16
Retaliatory discharge protections are premised on a number of the-
ories such as implied contract, 17 implied obligations of good faith'8
and violations of public policy. 19 The first case to incorporate a public
policy exception into the at-will employment doctrine was Petermann
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.20 In Petermann, the court
found that the employee was fired from his job because he refused to
give false testimony favorable to his union at a hearing before the
California Legislative Committee.21 The California Appellate Court
held that the employee stated a cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge because "in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared
policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his
generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employ-
ment is for an unspecified duration .... -22 The court circumvented
16. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876. 881 (Ill. 1981); see also
HILL, supra note 8, at 13-14 (stating that two-thirds of American jurisdictions have abandoned
an absolute employment-at-will rule).
17. Gensler, supra note 14, at 520-21. Implied contracts may arise out of both written and oral
communications. IRA M. SHEPARD ET AL., WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: AN EMPLOYER'S PRACTICAL
AND LEGAL GUIDE ON WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 75 (1989). These cases most often arise in the
context of employment relationships based on employee handbooks or manuals. See, e.g.,
Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (I11. 987) (determining that at-
will employment was modified by employee handbook so as to create enforceable contractual
rights).
18. Gensler, supra note 14 at 520-21; see, e.g., Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d
1155, 1158 (Alaska 1989) (holding that an enforceable duty of good faith is implied into every
employment relationship, including at-will employment).
19. Gensler, supra note 14, at 520-21.
20. 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The retaliatory discharge cause of action is
derived from the public policy exception to at-will employment and is generally recognized
when: (1) an employer discharges an employee in retaliation for employee activities, and (2) the
discharge contravenes a clearly mandated public policy. Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (Ill. 1981); accord Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ill. 1991)
(quoting Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 881) ("All that is required ... is that the employer discharge
the employee in retaliation for the employee's activities, and that the discharge be in contraven-
tion of a clearly mandated public policy."). "The retaliatory discharge exception has a narrower
scope than the public policy exception." John Jacob Kobus, Jr., Note, Establishing Corporate
Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1343, 1363 (1995) (citing
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878). This is because with the retaliatory discharge exception, the em-
ployee must be discharged in retaliation for the employee's activities, while the public policy
exception only requires that the discharge contravene a clearly mandated public policy. Id. The
difference is crucial because a plaintiff suing under the public policy exception need only prove
that the discharge was contrary to public policy, whereas a plaintiff suing under the retaliatory
discharge theory must also prove that the discharge was in "retaliation" for his or her actions.
Id.
21. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27.
22. Id.
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the judicially created employer privilege to discharge with or without
cause because of what it characterized as an overriding public policy
of upholding the integrity of the judicial process.23 This public policy
exception has been extended to include refusal to participate in un-
lawful acts,24 refusal to violate administrative regulations 25 and codes
of ethics,2 6 as well as the performance of important public obliga-
tions.2 7 Courts have been careful to limit the exception to cases where
the overriding public policy is clear. 28 Many courts, however, are re-
luctant to extend the public policy exception to attorneys because they
23. Id. The court stated: "The presence of false testimony in any proceeding tends to inter-
fere with the proper administration of public affairs and the administration of justice." Id. The
court believed "it would be obnoxious to the interest of the state and contrary to public policy
• . . to allow an employer to discharge any employee . . . on the ground that the employee
declined to commit perjury," an act which is prohibited by statute. Id. (referring to CAL. PENAL
CODE § 118 (West 1957)).
24. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 (Cal. 1980) (creating a
public policy exception for gas salesman who was fired for refusing to engage in a retail gas price
fixing scheme); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (creating a public
policy exception for deck hand fired for refusing to pump his sea vessel's bilge into the water in
violation of federal environmental law).
25. See, e.g., Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728, 730-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982) (extending public policy exception to pharmacist who was fired for refusing to close his
pharmacy counter contrary to state regulations).
26. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).
Employees who are professionals owe a special duty to abide not only by federal and
state law, but also by the recognized codes of ethics of their professions. That duty may
oblige them to decline to perform acts required by their employers [and] ... in certain
instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy.
Id.; see generally Alfred G. Feliu, Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against Dis-
missal For Acts Within A Professional Code of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 149 (1979-
80) (examining the need for a retaliatory discharge cause of action for professional employees
who are subject to a professional code of ethics and are subsequently discharged).
27. See, e.g., Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Ctrs., Inc., 842 F.2d 699, 702 (3d Cir. 1988) (ex-
tending the public policy exception to barmaid fired for refusing to serve liquor to a visibly
intoxicated person); Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 791-92 (Alaska
1986) (extending the public policy exception to Trans-Alaska Pipeline security guard who was
discharged for informing the pipeline operator, Aleyeska, that other guards were drinking and
using drugs while on duty).
28. HILL, supra note 8, at 28; see, e.g., Lambert v. City of Lake Forest, 542 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (analyzing and classifying situations in which the public policy exception has been
expanded). In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., the court stated that "the Achilles heel
of the principle lies in the definition of public policy." 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981). The court
in Petermann attempted to clarify the confusion over defining public policy:
The term "public policy" is inherently not subject to precise definition .... Mr. Story,
in his work on Contracts (section 546), says: "It has never been defined by the courts,
but has been left loose and free of definition in the same manner as fraud." By "public
policy" is intended that principle of law which has a tendency to be injurious to the public
or against the public good ....
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (quot-
ing Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1953)). Nevertheless, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. stated:
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are fearful of infringing upon the attorney-client relationship. 29 Only
recently have courts begun to extend the retaliatory discharge excep-
tion to in-house counsel.30
1. The Role of In-House Counsel
A growing number of attorneys within the legal profession are em-
ployed by only one corporate client.31 These attorneys are known as
in-house counsel or corporate counsel.32 Black's Law Dictionary de-
fines house counsel as any "lawyer who acts as attorney for business
though carried as an employee of that business and not as an in-
dependent lawyer. Generally, such lawyer advises business on day to
day matters. Large businesses have legal departments with attorneys
assigned to specialized areas of law .... -33 As employees of large
businesses, generally corporations, in-house counsel serve only one
[P]ublic policy concerns what is right and just and what effects the citizens of the State
collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are
silent, in its judicial decisions. Although there is no precise line of demarcation divid-
ing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal, a survey
of cases in other States involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike
at the heart of a citizens social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be
allowed.
421 N.E.2d at 878-79 (citations omitted).
29. Gensler, supra note 14, at 523; see Herbster v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 501 N.E.2d 343,
348 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (declining to extend a cause of action to in-house counsel in part because
of the attorney-client relationship).
30. For a sampling of courts accepting a retaliatory discharge cause of action for in-house
counsel, see General Dynamics v. Superior Court of San Bernadino Cty., 876 P.2d 487 (Cal.
1994); Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Assoc., 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Nordling
v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc.,
566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Klages v. Sperry Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2463 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1984).
31. See The State of the Legal Profession, 1990 ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVIsIoN 7 (noting
that in 1990 six percent of practicing lawyers were corporate counsel). A number of observers
believe as law firms continue to grow and legal costs increase, this percentage will continue to
rise, primarily due to an effort to keep ever-rising legal costs at a minimum. MARK STEVENS,
POWER OF ATroRNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT LAW Fiim 7-9 (1987). Another survey indi-
cated that more than ten percent of all attorneys in the United States are employed by corpora-
tions as in-house counsel. See Jeff Barge, For In-House Counsel, Safety In Numbers, A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1995, at 28 (stating that in-house counsel comprise about 10 percent of the entire attorney
population) (citing Fred Krebs, president of the 10,000 member American Corporate Counsel
Association).
32. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1994). Over the last
two decades the number and stature of in-house counsel has increased rapidly. Id. Corporations
have found that in-house counsel meet rather important needs. Id. A few of these needs are
cost incentives, the increasing complexity of the regulatory environment, and the problematic
nature of such organizations. Id.
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (6th ed. 1990).
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client, their employer, and that client controls all of their activities. 34
In-house counsel has become more important to corporations because
they can devote their time and resources to reducing fees and shifting
the workload in-house. 35
Today there is a large and increasing number of attorneys working
for corporations.36 This growth may be attributed to the benefits in-
house counsel offer to corporations. Not only do in-house counsel re-
duce costs to corporations, their time is devoted solely to the corpora-
tion which employs them-their only client.37 A unique situation is
created due to the fact that in-house counsel have only one client, as
compared to an attorney in private practice with a larger client base.
Therefore, the question that naturally arises is whether their status as
in-house counsel precludes them from pursuing a cause of action for
wrongful termination of employment.
34. Patricia Leigh O'Dell, Retaliatory Discharge: Corporate Counsel in A Catch-22, 44 ALA.
L. REV. 573, 580 (1993). Because the client-corporation has pervasive control, the employment
environment for an in-house counsel resembles essentially all the same characteristics of ordi-
nary at-will employment. Id. The role of the in-house counsel as practicing lawyers does not
change the essential nature of their status as employees. Id. at 597. Similar to other corporate
executives, in-house counsel have supervisors, must follow corporate policies and are subject to
review. Id. Louis C. Friedman suggested that in-house counsel need just as much judicial pro-
tection as their non-legal department counterparts. Louis C. Friedman, Should California House
Counsel Be Allowed to Claim Wrongful Termination? 14 W. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 431, 439 (1987).
Sara Corello argues that the in-house counsel's relationship with his or her employer is nearly
identical to other employees in two of the most important respects: (1) in-house counsel are
dependent on their employer-corporation for their entire income, benefits and pension; and (2)
in-house counsel are governed by any employee handbook and personnel policies, as well as
being subject to company controlled salary levels and promotions. Corello, supra note 8, at 405-
06. The corporation also controls the lawyer's hours and "the focus and nature of [the in-house
counsel's] practice." Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 87 (Kalitowski, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); see also Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (Ill. 1991) (Freeman, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that in-house counsel are just as tempted as other employees "to either ignore or
rationalize away their ethical obligations when complying therewith may render them unable to
feed and support their family").
35. Mark Stevens described the emerging importance of corporate counsel in the following
way:
In the new scheme of things, the corporate counsel would earn his stripes not by cod-
dling the outside firms, but by reducing their fees, by shifting more and more of the
workload in-house, and by severing relationships built on school ties in favor of those
based on legal expertise and sound economics.
STEVENs, supra note 31, at 9.
36. F. Leary Davis, Back to the Future: The Buyer's Market and the Need for Law Firm Lead-
ership, Creativity and Innovation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 147, 163 (1994).
37. Id.
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B. The Attorney-Client Relationship: Privilege and Confidentiality
The vitality of effective representation lies in the effective commu-
nication between lawyer and client.38 The attorney-client relationship
is traditionally a bilateral one in which a lawyer represents a client and
owes a fiduciary duty to that client.39 The attorney-client relationship
is promoted by two mechanisms: the attorney-client privilege and at-
torney-client confidentiality.40 Critics and courts fear that retaliatory
discharge suits are contrary to the lawyer's obligation as an attorney
to promote the interests of their client.41 Also, critics argue that retal-
iatory discharge suits by attorneys will breach the attorney client privi-
lege and confidentiality owed to the client.42 Proponents of
retaliatory discharge claims argue that the claims serve the goals of
38. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs § 4.5 (1986). The Supreme Court char-
acterized the attorney-client relationship as sui generis, stating that "[tlhere are few of the busi-
ness relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client...
few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice
.... " Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850).
39. John Levin, Ethical Issues in Serving the Organization as Client, 81 ILL. B.J. 483, 483
(1993). Rule 1.13, entitled Organization as Client, of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct
embodies this bilateral concept. Id. Rule 1.13 provides that the lawyer represents the organiza-
tion acting through its duly authorized "constituents," for example the employees, officers, direc-
tors, and shareholders. Id. The lawyer owes no special duty to the constituents because the
lawyer represents the organization as a whole and owes a fiduciary obligation only to the legal
entity. Id. at 484. Yet in all corporate settings, the counsel is directed by individual officers
because the corporation can only function through its constituents. WOLFRAM, supra note 38,
§ 13.7. When the objectives of the officer and the corporation are not the same, however, the in-
house counsel is required to pursue the best interest of the corporation even if it means going
against the officer's interest. Id.
40. Gensler, supra note 14, at 538. The concepts are distinct, though they are often times
confused or considered to mean the same thing. Nancy K. Renfer, Comment, Corporate Coun-
sels' Lack of Retaliatory Discharge Action, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 89, 103 (1989). Confidentiality
differs from attorney-client privilege in that the scope of information protected is greater under
confidentiality. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYER-
INo: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.6:108, at 142.9 to -
.10 ("The relationship between the attorney-client privilege and the confidentiality principle has
great practical significance, for although lawyers often assert the privilege as a matter of instinct,
they are ethically required to do so by the broader [confidentiality] principle."); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1992) ("The rule of client-lawyer confidenti-
ality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through
compulsion of law .... A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized by the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.").
41. Corello, supra note 8, at 406-07. Steven Gensler argues that the courts should preserve
harmonious attorney-client relationships by refusing to allow attorney discharge claims in an
attempt to dissuade employers from concealing business practices or problems from their in-
house counsel. Gensler, supra note 14, at 536 n.167. Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that "the danger exists that if in-house counsel are granted a right to sue their employers
in tort for retaliatory discharge, employers might further limit their communications with their
in-house counsel." Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (II1. 1991).
42. See, e.g., Gensler, supra note 14, at 536-52 (arguing that in order to preserve the harmoni-
ous attorney-client relationship courts should not extend the cause of action to in-house coun-
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the legal system without interfering with the ethical obligations of the
attorney-client privilege or attorney-client confidentiality.43
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege 44 is a rule of evidence that prohibits
the lawyer from disclosing information obtained through confidential
communications with the client and relating to representation in judi-
cial or other proceedings. 45 Typically, the privilege applies to confi-
sel); see also Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108 (refusing to extend a retaliatory discharge cause of action
to in-house counsel in part because of the attorney-client relationship).
43. O'Dell, supra note 34, at 594. Some commentators believe that extending the tort of retal-
iatory discharge will not damage the sanctity of confidential communications between in-house
counsel and a client because the evidentiary privilege and the ethical duty of confidentiality
contain an exception where a lawyer's services are sought in furtherance of a crime. E.g., Elliott
M. Abramson, Why Not Retaliatory Discharge for Attorneys: A Polemic, 58 TENN. L. REV. 271,
277 (1991). The argument that retaliatory discharge would have a chilling effect is refuted by the
basic notion that clients have no right to expect the assistance of counsel with certain types of
activities. O'Dell, supra note 34, at 595-96. Therefore, no chilling effect would result from ac-
tions for retaliatory discharge where an employer discharged an in-house counsel for acting ethi-
cally. In such a situation, unfettered client-attorney communications would be hindered since
these communications are currently excepted from the evidentiary and ethical privileges of con-
fidentiality. See infra notes 47 and 59 and accompanying text (discussing waiver of privilege and
confidentiality); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.6(b)(1) (1992)
(permitting a lawyer to reveal confidential information if the lawyer believes it necessary to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that is likely to result in imminent death or
bodily harm); see also UNiF. R. EVID 502(d)(1) (1974) ("There is no privilege ... if the services
of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what
the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud.").
44. The attorney-client privilege is found in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501; see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (holding that the attor-
ney-client privilege is premised upon the attorney's need to know all that relates to the client's
case in order provide adequate representation).
45. For a general discussion of the attorney-client privilege, see JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MAR-
GARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE MANUAL § 503 (1989); JoHN' H. WIOMORE, Evi-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2290-2329 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961). Rule 502(b)
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence states:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing a confidential communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendi-
tion of professional legal services to the client (i) between the client or a representative
of the client and the client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer, (ii) between the
lawyer and a representative of the lawyer, (iii) by the client or a representative of the
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dential disclosures made by the client to the attorney in the course of
seeking legal advice. 46 The privilege exists in order to protect and
promote "full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients .... ,47 The rationale which underlies the attorney-client privi-
lege is that the attorney should function as advocate and confidential
advisor to his client.48 If the privilege is waived or if the communica-
tions concern a continuing or future crime or fraud, the privilege
ceases to exist.49 Finally, the obligation of confidentiality is the same
for in-house counsel as it is for independent lawyers. 50
2. Attorney-Client Confidentiality
In contrast to the attorney-client privilege, which applies in judicial
and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or
otherwise be required to produce evidence concerning a client, attor-
ney-client confidentiality is a rule of ethics that applies in situations
"other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyers through
compulsion of law."' 51 The rule of confidentiality applies not only to
client or the client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a represen-
tative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a
matter of common interest therein, (iv) between representatives of the client or be-
tween the client and a representative of the client, or (v) among lawyers and their
representatives representing the same client.
UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (1974). Rule 502(d) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence states: "There is
no privilege under this rule ... [a]s to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by
a lawyer to the client or by a client to the lawyer. UNIF. R. EvID. 502 (d)(3) (1974).
46. WOLFRAM, supra note 38, § 6.3.2, at 251.
47. UpJohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
48. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL.
L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978).
49. WOLFRAM, supra note 38, §§ 6.4.2 and 6.4.10, at 268-69, 279-82. Important exceptions to
confidentiality include: (a) the crime-fraud exception; (b) the death or bodily injury exception;
(c) the deceased client exception; (d) the exception when a client breaches a duty to a lawyer;
and the joint client exception. Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Concerning a Lawyer's
Duty of Confidentiality, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1467, 1472 (1995).
50. Corello, supra note 8, at 411 n.126 (citing Doe v. A. Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1046-48 (5th Cir.
1983); Coleman v. American Broadcasting Cos., 106 F.R.D. 201, 206 (D.D.C. 1985); In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
84 F.R.D. 631, 635-36 (E.D. Pa. 1979)).
51. MODEL RuLms OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1992). Although not enacted
in all states, an expression of a lawyer's ethical duty of confidentiality may be found in the
Professional Code of Conduct and is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representations of a client unless
the client consent after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly author-
ized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
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matters communicated in confidence by the client to his or her attor-
ney but also to information relating to representation, whatever its
source.52 The professional codes of legal ethics define the scope of
attorney-client confidentiality.5 3 The foundation of attorney-client
confidentiality is based upon the law of agency.54 The professional
codes of legal ethics regulate the legal community in an effort to en-
sure that it is the principle (the client) who is served by the agent (the
attorney).5 5 Furthermore, a fiduciary duty owed to the client is im-
posed on the attorney by the professional code of legal ethics.5 6 These
professional codes of ethics, which have been enacted in slightly dif-
ferent forms in all the states,57 are necessary for a number of reasons.
First, such ethical standards discourage abuses of client information by
attorneys through professional disciplinary measures.58 Second, in
those situations when it is not clear as to whether the information is
privileged or not these codes provide an additional safeguard.5 9 Fi-
nally, because these rules incorporate the general law of agency,
agents (lawyers) are bound by professional codes of ethics to keep
information about their principles (clients) confidential. 60 Although
the client receives the benefits of confidentiality, the codes, and not
the client, determine which confidences are honored and protected. 61
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond
to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id. Rule 1.6.
52. Id. Rule 1.6 cmt.
53. WOLFRAM, supra note 38, § 6.7.1, at 296. The most widely accepted set of rules are the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been adopted in various forms by thirty-five
states. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 40, § AP4:101, at 1255. The Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, predecessor to the Model Rules, is followed by some states not adopting
the Model Rules, namely, Massachusetts, Oregon, Virginia and New York. Id. Both the Model
Rules and the Model Code govern disclosure by an attorney of all information about a client,
regardless of when or from whom the information was obtained. WOLFRAM, supra note 38, § 6.7
at 298.
54. ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 197
(1991).
55. Gensler, supra note 14, at 539.
56. Id. While the law of agency established a theoretical bases for client protection, the legal
ethics codes enlarge these protections due to the importance of "well-informed" legal advisors.
WOLFRAM, supra note 38, § 6.7.3, at 300.
57. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY at xxvii (1988).
58. WOLFRAM, supra note 38, § 6.7.3 at 300.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 299-300.
61. Id. § 6.7.2 to -.3; see also id. § 6.7.6 (discussing possible abuse by attorneys of confidential
information). Both sets of rules provide exceptions to the confidentiality rule, however, the
exception in the Model Code is broader than the exception provided in the Model Rules.
Raymis H.C. Kim, In-House Counsel's Wrongful Discharge Under the Public Policy Exception
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The cornerstone of the attorney-client relationship is effective com-
munication. Attorney-client privilege and confidentiality seek to max-
imize the vitality of the attorney-client relationship by ensuring the
sanctity of communications between an attorney and his or her client.
The rules of evidence and the professional codes of legal ethics apply
to in-house counsel the same as they apply to attorneys in private
practice. Thus, effective communication between an attorney and his
or her client is no less important for in-house counsel. In fact, with
the increased dependence placed on in-house counsel, full and frank
communications between in-house counsel and their large business
employers is essential to effective representation.
C. Retaliatory Discharge Law as Applied to In-House Counsel
A number of jurisdictions have addressed the question of whether
to extend a cause of action for retaliatory discharge to in-house coun-
sel.62 At the heart of these decisions has been an analysis of whether
the status of the in-house attorney should preclude them from bring-
ing a retaliatory discharge claim. The early line of cases maintained
that in-house counsel could be discharged at any time for no reason or
any reason at all. The established rule is that, as attorneys, in-house
counsel owe their clients special fiduciary duties which would other-
wise be infringed if courts allowed retaliatory discharge claims by at-
and Retaliatory Discharge Doctrine, 67 WASH. L. REV. 893, 898 (1992). For example, the Model
Code allows a lawyer to reveal "the intention of [the] client to commit a crime and the informa-
tion necessary to prevent the crime." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-
101(c)(3) (1981). An attorney has the option to keep information confidential even if the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies. Kim, supra, at 898. The attorney-client
confidentiality does not extend to communications of a client's intent to commit a future crime
or fraud. Id. Although the ethical codes allow an attorney to disclose confidential information,
the attorney is not required to disclose. Id. More restrictive confidentiality rules have been
adopted in nine states requiring attorneys to report information on future crimes, on penalty of
disbarment for failure to do so. See, e.g., ILCS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(b)
(1994) ("A lawyer shall reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to
prevent the client form committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm.").
The states other than Illinois which have adopted mandatory disclosure rules are Arizona, Con-
necticut, Florida, New Jersey, Nevada, North Dakota, Virginia and Wisconsin. HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 40, § AP4:104, app. at 1262 n.2.
62. For cases addressing the question of whether to extend a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge to in-house counsel, see, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F.Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986);
Klages v. Sperry Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1984); General Dynamics v.
Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991);
Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Assoc., 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Nordling v.
Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 566
A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); McGonagle v. Union Fid. Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988).
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torneys.63 Only recently have courts begun to allow for a limited
exception to traditional at-will employment.64' This exception, based
largely on public policy, enables in-house counsel to seek a remedy for
retaliatory discharge.
1. Courts Which Have Refused to Extend a Cause of Action to In-
House Counsel-Decisions Leading Up to Balla v.
Gambro, Inc.
Balla v. Gambro, Inc.65 was the culmination of a number of earlier
decisions in the area of retaliatory discharge which declined to extend
a cause of action to in-house counsel. The role and character of the
attorney-client relationship has been closely analyzed with respect to
extending a cause of action for retaliatory discharge to attorneys.
Prior to Balla, three major decisions refused to extend a cause of ac-
tion to in-house counsel who were allegedly victims of retaliatory
discharge. 66
a. Herbster v. North American Company for Life and Health
Insurance
The Appellate Court of Illinois was confronted with the question of
retaliatory discharge in Herbster v. North American Co. for Life &
Health Insurance.67 The suit arose when the plaintiff, chief legal of-
ficer and vice-president in charge of the legal department for North
American Health Insurance, refused to destroy or remove documents
relating to a pending law suit against North American.68 The plaintiff
63. See, e.g., General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503 (indicating that retaliatory discharge actions
by attorneys are limited by conflicts with professional ethics); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for
Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that confidential communi-
cations between attorney and client are "inviolate" after termination); Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at
504 (expressing concern about privileged information and retaliatory charges).
64. See, e.g., Klages, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463, 2468 (indicating that "in roads" now exist
to an employers "unfettered" power to discharge an employee-at-will); General Dynamics, 876
P.2d at 495 (holding that an employer must adhere to its published discharge procedures when
terminating an in-house counsel); Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 399 (discussing cases that have made
exception to at-will employment termination because of public policy); Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at
503 (holding that attorney could pursue cause of action for employer's failure to follow contrac-
tual provisions in employee handbook); Parker, 566 A.2d at 218 (stating that employer has a
duty to protect employee's right to refuse to violate public policy).
65. 584 N.E.2d 104 (I11. 1991).
66. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Herbster v. North American Co.
for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (II1. App. Ct. 1986); McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp.,
556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
67. 501 N.E.2d 343 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
68. Id. at 344. The documents were work product from North American's actuarial depart-
ment and contained information which suggested fraud in the sale of flexible annuities sold by
North American. Id. If plaintiff would have followed orders, the action would have constituted
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appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
North American Health Insurance.69
In response, the appellate court addressed the issue of whether an
attorney, as an employee of a large business, is entitled to a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge.70 The Herbster court reiterated the
Illinois Supreme Courts' holding in Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. that
[t]his court has not, by its Palmateer and Kelsay decisions, "rejected
a narrow interpretation of the retaliatory discharge tort" and does
not "strongly support" the expansion of the tort. The common law
doctrine that an employer may discharge an employee-at-will for
any reason or for no reason is still the law in Illinois, except for
when the discharge violates a clearly mandated public policy.71
The court could not "separate plaintiff's role as an employee from his
profession" because his duties for the corporation were legal in na-
ture.72 According to the court, the attorney has the opportunity to
withdraw, and in some instances the law mandates that an attorney
a fraud on the Federal Court and would have resulted in a violation of Rules 1-102(5) and 7-
109(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
69. Id. North American's motion for summary judgment averred that:
(1) there was no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) there was no cause of action
for retaliatory discharge by an attorney who is terminated by his client; (3) plaintiff was
discharged because the quality of his work; and (4) they never ordered, demanded or
directed plaintiff to destroy or remove any discovery information.
Id.
70. Id. at 344. Neither counsel nor court cited any case on point, thus the court looked to the
history of retaliatory discharge to determine whether the plaintiff was an employee within the
meaning of existing retaliatory discharge case law. Id. In 1978, Illinois recognized retaliatory
discharge as an exception to the general rule which barred a cause of action by at-will employ-
ees. Id. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (Ill. 1978) (holding that an employer's
absolute power to discharge at-will should not prevail when it is used to prevent an employee
from asserting his statutory rights under the Worker's Compensation Act because such an action,
if permitted, would greatly undermine the Act); see also Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (I11. 1981) (stating that there is a growing need for the tort of retaliatory
discharge as an exception to the general rule that at-will employees may be discharged for any
reason or for no reason at all). The Herbster court, while concentrating on the rise of large,
specialized corporations and the relative immobility of current employees, felt that the retalia-
tory discharge exception adequately recognized that employees often do not stand on equal
footing with employers. 501 N.E.2d at 345.
71. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 345 (quoting Barr v. Kelso-Burnett, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (I11.
1985)).
72. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 345-46. The court pointed to the fact that attorneys maintain a
special position in our society, the uniqueness of which is shown by the fact that the attorney
receives secrets and information "that otherwise would not be divulged to intimate friends." Id.
at 346. On account of this unique relationship the law subjects the attorney to a fiduciary duty in
favor of his client. Id. at 347. Furthermore, because of the confidential nature of the attorney-
client relationship, the general law provides that a client may terminate the relationship with an
attorney with or without cause. Id.; see Tobias v. King, 406 N.E.2d 101, 103 (I11. App. Ct. 1980)
(stating that a client may discharge counsel at any time, with or without cause).
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withdraw when his client threatens to commit a crime. 73 The court
could not justify extending the tort to attorneys because "the mutual
trust, exchanges of confidence, reliance on judgment and personal na-
ture of the attorney-client relationship" are so necessary to our judi-
cial system.74 Thus, the court held that an attorney under these
circumstances did not have a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge. 75
b. Willy v. Coastal Corporation
In Willy v. Coastal Corp.,76 Donald Willy, as in-house counsel for
Coastal Corporation, brought a retaliatory discharge suit in a Texas
federal district court.77 Willy alleged he was discharged for insisting
that Coastal Corporation comply with various federal and state envi-
ronmental laws.78 The court upheld Willy's dismissal on the ground
that
if an attorney believes that his client is intent upon pursuing an ille-
gal act, the attorney's option is to voluntarily withdraw from em-
ployment. When an attorney elects not to withdraw and not to
follow his client's wishes, he should not be surprised that his client
no longer desires his services. Once the client does elect to termi-
nate the relationship, however, the attorney is required to withdraw
from any further representation of that client. The standard is the
same for an in-house counsel.79
The Willy court did not find that extending the public policy exception
was necessary or proper.80 Nor did the court find a cause of action for
termination of an attorney's services to be within the exception to em-
ployment-at-will, as adopted by the Texas Supreme Court.81
73. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
74. Id.
75. Id. Roger Balla argued that the Herbster opinion, while declining to extend the tort of
retaliatory discharge on its facts, did not foreclose the possibility of extending the tort under
different circumstances. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 106 (I11. 1991). Balla pointed to
the fact that the duties of the plaintiff in Herbster were limited to legal matters, while Balla, in
addition to being general counsel, served as the director of administration and personnel and
manager of regulatory affairs for Gambro. Id. The Balla court rejected this argument. Id.
76. 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
77. Id. at 117.
78. Id. Willy contended that he "left the employment of the company involuntarily." Id.
79. Id. at 118.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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c. McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corporation
In McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp.,82 John McGonagle, as corpo-
ration counsel for Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company, became
aware that Union Fidelity was not in compliance with various state
insurance regulations.8 3 Union Fidelity intended to mail insurance
policies in Utah which McGonagle concluded would be a violation of
Utah's insurance regulations. 84 After a meeting with the vice-presi-
dent in charge of marketing, McGonagle refused to authorize the
mailings to Utah because he considered them to be "illegal. '8 5
McGonagle was subsequently dismissed from his position as corpora-
tion counsel.86
McGonagle filed a complaint averring that his termination was the
result of his efforts to have Union Fidelity and its subsidiaries discon-
tinue their violations of the insurance laws of several states.87 In addi-
tion, McGonagle alleged that his termination was wrongful because it
violated a clear and compelling mandate of public policy.8 8 The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court found no Pennsylvania case on point which
supported the argument that McGonagle was terminated because he
attempted to fulfill state statutory responsibilities. 89 According to the
court, in the absence of any recognized violation of state law or public
policy the court need not inquire into whether the defendants had a
justifiable reason for firing McGonagle. 90 In turn, the court suggested
that if the plaintiff could point to a "specific expression of public pol-
82. 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
83. Id. at 879. In December of 1980, McGonagle was named general counsel as well as being
a manager of the Union Fidelity Insurance Company, a leader in mass-marketing insurance via
direct mail. Id. In February of 1981, he became a vice-president at Union Fidelity and was
named to the board of directors. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. At the meeting the vice-president of marketing "threatened to start firing [personnel]
until he recovered enough salary to cover the dollars that he was losing on the sale . I..." ld.
McGonagle later learned of other questionable insurance practices conducted by Union Fidelity
in New York, Minnesota, Connecticut and Pennsylvania. Id. at 879-80. McGonagle decided to
stop the issuance of policies in Utah and Pennsylvania because he felt they were illegal, even
though he knew that such a decision would have economic repercussions. Id. at 880. Addition-
ally, McGonagle ceased the practice of not honoring CAT scan claims because he feared such a
policy would expose the corporation to "unfair claims" charges. Id.
86. Id. at 881. On April 29, 1981, the vice-president of marketing told McGonagle, "I want
your resignation, I want you out of here." Id. at 880. The termination did not comply with the
company's policy manual on personnel changes. ld. at 881.
87. Id. A jury returned a verdict in favor of McGonagle in the amount of $30,000 for the
wrongful discharge claim and an additional $32,000 in punitive damages. Id. Union Fidelity
appealed. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 883.
90. Id.
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icy violated by his discharge," then the court would qualify the dis-
charge as "wrongful and within the sphere of public policy." 91 The
court made it clear that the attorney has a dual role to abide by fed-
eral and state law as well as follow the professional code of ethics. 92
These responsibilities may demand that the in-house counsel forego
the performance of an act commanded by the employer.93
d. Balla v. Gambro, Inc.
Balla v. Gambro, Inc.94 is the leading opinion denying retaliatory
discharge suits by in-house counsel. In that case, Roger Balla, in-
house counsel for Gambro, filed a complaint in tort for retaliatory
discharge seeking twenty-two million dollars in damages.95 Gambro, a
distributor of kidney dialysis equipment,96 hired Balla on March 17,
1980 to "be responsible for all legal matters within the company and
for personnel within the company's sales office. ' 97 Gambro Di-
alysatorem, Gambro's affiliate in Germany, notified Gambro that de-
fective dialyzers would be shipped in their next delivery.98 Balla
advised the president of Gambro to reject the shipment on account of
its failure to comply with U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulations. 99 One week later, the president of Gambro decided to
accept the shipment of dialyzers and sell them to a buyer who was not
91. Id. at 885.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 584 N.E.2d 104 (III. 1991).
95. Id. at 106. Balla alleged that he was fired in contravention of Illinois public policy. Id.
The trial court dismissed the action on Gambro's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 105. The
appellate court decision, Gambro Inc. v. Balla, 560 N.E.2d 1043 (I11. App. Ct. 1990), was re-
versed. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 105.
96. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 105. Gambro distributes dialyzers which filter excess fluid and toxic
substances from the blood of patients with kidney problems. Id. The manufacture and sale of
these machines is regulated by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 21
C.F.R. §§ 820.150 to 820.198 (1987), the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 331-451 (1988), and the Illinois Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 410 ILCS 620/1 to 620/26
(1992). Id.
97. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 105. As director of administration, Balla's duties included: "advising,
counseling and representing management on legal matters; establishing and administering per-
sonnel policies; coordinating and overseeing corporate activities to assure compliance with appli-
cable laws and regulations; ... preventing or minimizing legal or administrative proceedings"
and, as of August, 1983 managed regulatory affairs. Id. at 105-06. As manager of regulatory
affairs Balla was "responsible for ensuring awareness of and compliance with federal, state and
local laws and regulations affecting the company's operations and products." Id. at 106.
98. Id. Gambro Germany advised Gambro that: "[f]or acute patients risk is that the acute
uremic situation will not be improved in spite of the treatment .... The chronic patient may
note the effect as a slow progression of the uremic situation and depending on the interval be-
tween medical check-ups the medical risk may be overlooked." Id.
99. Id.
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currently a customer of Gambro. 100 When Balla learned of the deci-
sion he told the president of Gambro that he would do whatever was
necessary to stop the sale of the defective dialyzers. 10 Two weeks
later, on September 4, 1985, Balla was discharged from his job at
Gambro.102 The next day, Balla reported Gambro's violations to the
FDA, which seized the shipment of defective dialyzers and deter-
mined them to be in violation of section 501(h) of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.10 3
After Balla brought suit for retaliatory discharge, Gambro moved
for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. 104 The trial
court held that due to Balla's status as Gambro's attorney, the com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action because a client has an absolute
right to discharge their attorney. 10 5 The Appellate Court of Illinois
for the First District reversed and remanded, holding that the trial
court erred in determining that Balla, as an attorney, was barred from
bringing a suit for retaliatory discharge. 10 6 In particular, the appellate
court articulated three questions of fact which needed determination
by the trier of fact: (1) whether the discharge related to information
which Balla obtained as a "layman" (non-legal position); (2) whether
Balla acquired the information as a result of his attorney-client rela-
tionship and whether the information was privileged; and (3) whether
any countervailing public policy considerations exist which favor dis-
closure of privileged information obtained from the attorney-client
relationship.10 7
Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court
decision, 08 reaffirming the circuit court decision. 10 9 The supreme
court maintained the position that " 'an employer may discharge an
employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason [at all].' "11
The Illinois Supreme Court has followed a very narrow and limited
approach to the tort of retaliatory discharge. The first decision in
Illinois to allow a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was Kelsay
v. Motorola, Inc."' The supreme court created an exception to the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1047.
107. Id.
108. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (II1. 1991).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 107 (quoting Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Il1. 1985)).
111. 384 N.E.2d 353 (I11. 1978).
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general rule that at-will employment is terminable at any time and for
any or no cause when it upheld a suit for discharge in retaliation for
filing workmen's compensation claims. 112 The retaliatory discharge
cause of action was slightly enlarged in Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co.1" 3 to include cases in which an employer terminates an em-
ployee in violation of an established public policy. 114 The Supreme
Court of Illinois stated, in Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 1' 5 that "this court
has not, by its Palmateer and Kelsay decisions, 'rejected a narrow in-
terpretation of the retaliatory discharge tort' and does not 'strongly
support' the expansion of the tort.""16 This view was echoed in Herb-
112. Id. at 360-61. In Kelsay, an at-will employee was fired for filing a worker's compensation
claim against her employer after injuring herself on the job. Id. at 355. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the employee had a cause of action for retaliatory discharge because otherwise
the public policy behind the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act would be frus-
trated. Id. at 357. The Kelsay decision, which was the first exception to the at-will doctrine,
limited its holding strictly to statutory rights under the Worker's Compensation Act. Id. at 358.
The court stated: "We are not convinced that an employer's otherwise absolute power to termi-
nate an employee at will should prevail when that power is exercised to prevent the employee
from asserting his statutory rights under the Worker's Compensation Act." Id. An employer's
effective frustration of the Act is "untenable and is contrary to the public policy as expressed in
the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. at 357.
113. 421 N.E.2d 876 (I11. 981).
114. Id. at 879. The supreme court in Palmateer held that an employee has a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge when the employer terminates an employee in violation of an estab-
lished public policy - other than the policy expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act. Id.
The plaintiff, an at-will employee, alleged that he was fired for informing and cooperating with
police in investigating a possible theft suspect at his place of employment. Id. The Illinois
Supreme Court stated:
It is clear that Palmateer has here alleged that he was fired in violation of an estab-
lished public policy. The claim is that he was discharged for supplying information to a
local law enforcement agency that an IH [International Harvester] employee might be
violating the Criminal Code, for agreeing to gather further evidence implicating the
employee and for intending to testify at the employee's trial, if it came to that ....
There is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, than the enforcement of a State's criminal code. There is no public policy more
important than the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of
citizens.
Id.
The supreme court noted in Palmateer that the Kelsay court acknowledged "that parties to a
contract may not incorporate in it rights and obligations which are clearly injurious to the public
.... But the Achilles heel of the principle lies in the definition of public policy .... In general,
it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the
State collectively." Id. at 878. Even though no exact line of demarcation exists, the Palmateer
court noted that a survey of cases from foreign jurisdictions reveals that "a matter must strike at
the heart of citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed." Id.
at 878-79. In sum, the court found that the retaliatory discharge cause of action is allowed where
the public policy is clear, but is denied where it is equally clear that only private interests are at
stake. Id. at 879.
115. 478 N.E.2d 1354 (I11. 1985).
116. Id. at 1356. Since the Kelsay decision, the retaliatory discharge cause of action has been
limited to two settings in Illinois. First, as set forth in Kelsay, retaliatory discharge is accepted
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ster v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance, in which the
Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, declined to extend the tort
of retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel, primarily because of the
special relationship between the attorney and the client.117 The court
found that "the mutual trust, exchanges of confidence, reliance on
judgment and personal nature of the attorney-client relationship
demonstrate the unique position attorneys occupy in our society.""18
Despite any limitations the Illinois Supreme Court has placed on
the tort of retaliatory discharge, its ultimate purpose lies in its protec-
tion of public policy. 119 Applying the reasoning from the Herbster de-
cision, the Balla court found that the policy of protecting the lives and
property of citizens is adequately safeguarded under the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. 20 The Rules require an attorney in Balla's posi-
tion to report Gambro's intention to sell dialyzers which would result
in death or bodily harm to people.' 21 According to the Illinois
Supreme Court, in-house counsel do not have a choice between com-
mitting an illegal or unethical act, as demanded by their employer, or
following their ethical obligations; all attorneys are bound by the code
of ethics. 22 The court stated that if in-house counsel were allowed to
recover for retaliatory discharge the side-effects on the attorney-client
when the employee is discharged for filing a claim under the Worker's Compensation Act, 820
ILCS 305/1 to 305/30 (1992). Kelsey, 384 N.E.2d at 357. Second, when an employee is dis-
charged for reporting illegal or improper conduct or refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act
retaliatory discharge is recognized. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d
876 (I1. 1981) (employee reported a violation of the criminal code to authorities); Russ v. Pen-
sion Consultants, Inc., 538 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (employee refused to falsify docu-
ments); Witt v. Forest Hospital, Inc., 450 N.E.2d 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (plaintiff informed
regulatory agency of violation of Guardianship and Advocacy Act); Shore v. Senior Manor
Nursing Home, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 471 (11. App. Ct. 1988) (employee reported violation of Nursing
Care Reform Act).
Thus, to establish a cause of action for retaliatory discharge in Illinois an employee must show
that: (1) he or she was discharged; (2) that the discharge was in retaliation of the employees
activities; and (3) that the discharge was in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy.
Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 601 N.E.2d 720, 728 (Ill. 1992). "The element of causation is not
met if the employer has a valid basis, which is not pretextual, for discharging the employee." Id.
117. 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
118. Id. The appellate court distinguished the role of attorneys from other employees in-
volved in earlier retaliatory discharge suits. The court pointed out that most employees do not
have the mutuality of choice that is an integral part of the professional relationship which attor-
neys enjoy. Id. For these reasons the appellate court found "that all aspects are so necessary to
our system of jurisprudence that extending this tort to the attorney-client relationship here is not
justified." Id.
119. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (I11. 1991).
120. Id. at 108-09.
121. Id. See RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr, ILL Sup. CT. R. 1.6(b) (West 1994) ("A
lawyer shall reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the
client from committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm.").
122. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
privilege might create a chilling effect on the communication between
an employer-corporation and the in-house counsel. 123 The court
noted, for example, that if in-house counsel could use all corporate
information in a retaliatory discharge action, employers might be less
candid or even refuse to consult in-house counsel regarding poten-
tially illegal corporate conduct. 124 The court finally suggested that
when in-house counsel are presented with ethical conflicts, they have
the opportunity and the obligation to withdraw from representa-
tion. 25 The court reasoned that attorneys should understand that at
certain times in their legal careers they must forego monetary gain in
order to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. 2 6
Though these courts have not extended a cause of action to wrong-
fully discharged in-house counsel, they represent but one side of the
spectrum. While arguments for protecting the attorney-client privi-
lege and attorney-client confidentiality are very persuasive in many
circumstances, some courts have found situations where the extension
of a retaliatory discharge cause of action was warranted.
2. Courts Which Have Extended a Cause of Action to In-House
Counsel-Decisions Leading Up to General Dynamics v.
Superior Court
Changing economic conditions have prompted criticism that the at-
will doctrine is detrimental to the interests of all parties involved in
the employment relationship. 2 7 As a result, some courts and legisla-
tures have begun to fashion a remedy for wrongfully discharged em-
ployees in the form of a civil action for retaliatory discharge. A
variety of reasons have been offered as support for those jurisdictions
which have concluded that in-house counsel have a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge.
123. Id.
124. Id. The United States Supreme Court, in UpJohn Co. v. United States, stated the follow-
ing regarding the attorney-client privilege:
Its purpose is to encourage the full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that strong legal advice or advocacy
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being
fully informed by the client.
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
125. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110.
126. Id. Balla argued that the choice of withdrawing from representation is "simplistic and
uncompassionate, and is completely at odds with contemporary realities facing in-house attor-
neys." Id.
127. O'Dell, supra note 34, at 573.
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Although the decision in Balla v. Gambro, Inc. was considered the
leading opinion throughout the nation addressing retaliatory dis-
charge of in-house counsel, the seeds were sown for an extension of a
retaliatory discharge claim to in-house counsel in a number of earlier
decisions. 128 These earlier cases based their holdings in favor of a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge on a number of grounds: (1)
whistle-blower statutes; 129 (2) implied-in-fact contracts; 130 and (3) stat-
utory or ethical considerations. 131 General Dynamics Corp. v. Supe-
rior Court, which ultimately acknowledged the cause of action of
retaliatory discharge for in-house counsel, was the culmination of
these earlier decisions.
a. Parker v. M & T Chemicals
The New Jersey Superior Court in Parker v. M & T Chemicals, ad-
dressed the issue of wrongful discharge of an in-house counsel.132
Sheldon Parker, an attorney, was employed by M & T Chemicals as
director of patents.' 33 His duties included administrative and business
functions as well as performing in a legal capacity. 34 The corporation
requested that Parker oversee the copying and use of confidential
transcripts which contained a competitor's technology needed to man-
ufacture methyltin stabilizers. 35 Parker alleged that after his refusal
to follow the corporation's request, he was subjected to retaliation and
128. See, e.g., Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Assoc., 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that an attorney could maintain a claim for retaliatory demotion stemming from a re-
fusal to take the action which would have violated the Code of Professional Conduct); Nordling
v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (holding attorney-client relationship
does not preclude a suit for wrongful discharge against a corporate employer); Parker v. M & T
Chemicals, Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that a retaliating em-
ployer may be compelled to pay damages to a wrongfully discharged employer); Klages v. Sperry
Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1984) (upholding a suit by in-house counsel
for retaliatory discharge).
129. Parker, 566 A.2d at 215; see infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (discussing whis-
tle-blower acts as applied to retaliatory discharge).
130. See, e.g., Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 395; Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 498; see infra notes 145-63
and accompanying text (discussing the "implied contract to discharge for cause" exception as
applied to retaliatory discharge).
131. See, e.g., Klages, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
132. 566 A.2d at 216.
133. Id. Sheldon Parker was employed for seven years during which time "he received
favorable evaluations and raises which recognized his meritorious service." Id. at 217.
134. Id.
135. Id. Parker sent a memorandum to M & T's general counsel in which he objected to M &
T's proposed actions. Id. Parker continued to object because he reasonably believed that the
corporation was "engaged in unlawful and fraudulent conduct in violation of the canons of ethics
binding attorneys." Id. at 218.
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eventually a "constructive discharge."'1 36 The New Jersey court held
that this case fell under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act
(CECA), 137 commonly referred to as the "whistle-blower act."'1 38 The
court held that CECA could constitutionally apply to attorneys. 139
The court stated that CECA is not inconsistent with the Code of Pro-
fessional Ethics when the attorney seeks monetary damages, as op-
posed to reinstatement, because the employer can still file an ethics
complaint against a former attorney if any professional confidences or
proprieties were violated.' 40 Nevertheless, the court refused to specu-
late on "the scope or extent of the attorney-client privilege against
disclosure of confidential communications in litigation of this sort.' 141
b. Klages v. Sperry Corporation
Similarly, in Klages v. Sperry Corp.,142 a Pennsylvania court upheld
a suit by an in-house counsel fired in retaliation for investigating
136. Id. Parker alleged in his complaint that "defendants created an intolerable work envi-
ronment for plaintiff that exacerbated an existing medical condition and caused plaintiff great
anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation .. . . By this conduct defendants constructively dis-
charged plaintiff from his employment." Id.
137. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(c) (West 1988).
138. Parker, 566 A.2d at 216. The Whistleblower Act prohibits retaliatory discharge when
employees object to or refuse to participate in an activity that the employee reasonably believes
is in violation of a law or is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 218.
139. Id. at 220. The court rejected defendant's assertion that the whistle-blowers act (Act)
unconstitutionally impinged on the Supreme Court's plenary and exclusive power to regulate the
conduct of attorneys. Id. at 219. Rather, the court stated that its construction of the Act "com-
pels a retaliating employer to pay damages to an employee-attorney who is wrongfully dis-
charged or mistreated for refusing to join a scheme to cheat a competitor or, indeed, for any
reason which is violative of law, fraudulent, criminal, or incompatible with a clear mandate of...
public policy concerning public health, safety or welfare." Id. at 220.
140. Id. The employer has the opportunity to prove at trial that the discharge was due to
incompetence, disloyalty, reduction in force, or any other legitimate reason. Id. The Court as-
sured that its holding did not discourage ethics complaints against "shiftless attorneys or foist
unwanted counselors on public or even private clients" because the employer (client) still has
the opportunity to file an ethics complaint against the former employee (attorney). Id. The
court believed its holding would discourage employers from inducing employee-attorneys to par-
ticipate in or condone illegal activities, instead, with specific statutory protections, the attorney
should be encouraged to resist such inducements. Id.
141. Id. at 222 n.2. The court stated that questions concerning the attorney-client privilege,
when they arise, should be resolved at the trial level. Id. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(c)(2) states:
[A] lawyer may reveal information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes neces-
sary: (2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil
claim or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer based upon the conduct in which the
client was involved. A lawyer is permitted to disclose otherwise confidential informa-
tion which he reasonably believes necessary to support a claim against a client.
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.6(c)(2) (1992).
142. 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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whether real estate commissions paid by the Sperry Corporation to
the president's wife constituted securities violations. 143  The court
suggested that the suit was necessary to promote compliance with the
securities statutes and with the legal code of ethics. 144
c. Mourad v. Automobile Insurance Association
In Mourad v. Automobile Insurance Ass'n,145 a Michigan appellate
court was faced with a case where the plaintiff was demoted from legal
area manager to executive attorney. 146 The plaintiff brought an action
based on a breach of contract, constructive discharge, retaliatory de-
motion and infliction of emotional distress.147 The corporation con-
tended that the demotion was in response to Mourad's administrative
deficiencies, while Mourad claimed the demotion was in response to
his refusal to implement policy decisions contrary to the state's code
of professional conduct. 148 At the trial court level the jury found that
the company manual created a contract to terminate for just cause. 149
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the "just cause" contract
claim but disallowed Mourad's retaliatory discharge claim as both du-
plicative and inconsistent with a finding of an enforceable contract.150
The retaliatory discharge claim was duplicative because the defend-
ants "knew or should have known that plaintiff was bound by the code
of professional conduct and incorporated this fact in creating a just-
143. Id. Plaintiff, Robert D. Klages, was employed by the Sperry Corporation as vice presi-
dent and general counsel of Computer Systems, an unincorporated business group within the
Sperry Corporation. Id.
144. Id. at 2469.
145. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
146. Id. at 396. Roger Mourad was employed by Auto Club Insurance Association. Id. at 397.
Plaintiff was named legal area manager in 1980, which entailed heading the corporations in-
house legal department. Id. Then in March of 1983 plaintiff was demoted to an executive attor-
ney position. Id. The legal department's tasks included supervising outside counsel, as well as
providing legal counsel and advice to the corporations claims staff regarding nonlitigation mat-
ters. Id.
147. Id. A jury awarded plaintiff a verdict in the amount of $1,773,000, which the defendant
appealed. Id. While the plaintiff filed a cross appeal on account of the trial court's refusal to
enter an additional $500,000 in exemplary damages which the jury awarded on a special verdict
form for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
148. Id. The Court stated: "It appears that plaintiff was an excellent lawyer." Id. Plaintiff's
supervisor claimed that plaintiff was unable to implement the corporation's policies and plaintiff
"did not have the 'administrative talents' necessary to effectively implement cost-containment
measures in the legal department." Id. Plaintiff claims his demotion stems from alleged unethi-
cal and illegal orders from his supervisors, who were not attorneys, which he refused to carry out
because these orders violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Ethics. Id.
149. Id. at 398.
150. Id. at 401.
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cause employment contract."'15' The court of appeals distinguished
the earlier retaliatory discharge of in-house counsel decisions of the
courts in Willy, Herbster, and Parker concluding that those cases ad-
dressed the question of whether the state will recognize a public policy
exception in the typical employment-at-will contract. 152 Whereas in
Mourad the jury found that a just-cause contract existed which was
then breached by defendants. 153 The court further noted that it re-
fused to adopt a complete bar to suits brought by an attorney for re-
taliatory discharge and breach of a contract for just cause on the basis
of the attorney-client relationship. 154
d. Nordling v. Northern States Power Company
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of wrongful dis-
charge in Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 55 where a private
attorney suggested surveillance of Northern State Power (NSP) em-
ployees, both at work and at home. 156 Gale K. Nordling, as NSP's in-
house counsel, voiced opposition to this suggestion believing it to be
an illegal invasion of privacy.157 When his supervisors failed to act,
Nordling reported the surveillance plan to company executives who
151. Id. at 400. Although the corporation was not directly bound by the code of professional
conduct, the defendants contracted not to terminate an attorney without good cause, thereby
agreeing to be bound indirectly by the code. Id.
152. Id. at 399.
153. Id. The court concluded that to find a public policy exception required a different inquiry
from that necessary to find a breach of a just-cause contract. Id. In Mourad, the court merely
needed to find contractual rights between the parties, as compared to determining restrictions on
employment discharge based on public policy grounds. Id. Another point of distinction was that
Mourad did not simply involve an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and defend-
ant because the plaintiff, who supervised lawsuits involving catastrophic injury, was also plaintiff
for the insureds. Id. at 400.
154. Id. at 399.
155. 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
156. Nordling v. Northern State Power, 465 N.W.2d 81, 83 (Minn. App. 1991). In the begin-
ning of 1987, NSP was planning to seek approval for electricity rate increases for which the NSP
Law Department began preparations for proceedings before the Public Utility Commission. Id.
at 83. "SherCo III," a new electrical power generation facility, because of its $1 billion cost of
construction, was the major reason for the rate increase. Id. The Law Department established a
task force which was to prepare for potential questions which the Commission might ask in
regards to the rate increases. Id. The task force consulted an attorney in private practice to
determine which procedures NSP would need to follow in order to comply with the commission.
Id. David McGannon, NSP's Vice President of Law, told Gale K. Nordling that the private
attorney was conducting a "personal lifestyle investigation" of NSP employees working at the
SherCo III power plant. Id.
157. Id. Nordling started working for NSP in 1971 as an engineer and continued to work in
this capacity while he attended law school. Id. at 82. After passing the bar in 1975, Nordling
joined the NSP Law Department as in-house counsel. Id. Nordling's responsibilities included
drafting and negotiating contracts related to the utility business, which included construction of
NSP's utility plants. Id.
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then put a stop to the plan.158 Soon thereafter, Nordling was dis-
charged without notice or warning.159 In addition, NSP failed to com-
ply with disciplinary procedures contained in the NSP's employee
handbook.160 Nordling filed suit against NSP and its vice president,
David McGannon. 161 The Nordling court resolved the case by holding
that the attorney-client privilege does not prevent an attorney from
bringing a wrongful discharge suit based on an implied contract the-
ory.162 Despite holding that an in-house counsel may have the right to
file a claim for retaliatory discharge, the Minnesota Supreme Court
dismissed the retaliatory discharge action as a matter of law because
there was no violation of the state's whistleblower statute or of any
state or federal law.163
From these earlier rulings emerged the General Dynamics decision.
In Parker, the court was willing to create an exception to the general
rule that attorneys may not pursue a claim for retaliatory discharge,
holding that the facts of the case fell under the state's whistle-blower
act.164 The Klages decision based its finding of a cause of action for
158. Id. at 83. McGannon began to closely monitor Nordling's activities because he suspected
that Nordling was spending his time on non-work related matters during the day. Id. McGan-
non next sent Nordling a memorandum which cited Nordling for failing to comply with an earlier
memorandum that instructed Law Department personnel on use of the message board to let
people know when one was out of the office. Id. at 83-84. Soon after the memorandum was
sent, Nordling met with McGannon because he felt these criticisms were unwarranted. Id. at 84.
McGannon retracted the memorandum and indicated that he would destroy it. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. McGannon's stated reasons for discharging Nordling included his belief that
Nordling was unhappy and that this mood was effecting his job performance. This, coupled with
the fact that Nordling did not say "good morning, good night, [or] how are you" and that he
impeded a lunch meeting between Law Department personnel were acts leading to his dismissal.
Id. While the NSP employee handbook provided a policy of "Positive Discipline" which out-
lined steps to be followed before an employee could be terminated, none of them were followed
before Nordling was discharged. Id.
161. Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Minn. 1991).
162. Id. at 502.
163. Id. at 504. While the Nordling court did not rule on the retaliatory discharge issue, the
case is nonetheless important because it recognizes a wrongful discharge action by an in-house
counsel against his or her employer. Id. at 499. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
The fact remains.., that the in-house attorney is also a company employee, and we see
no reason to deny the job security aspects of the employer-employee relationship if this
can be done without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. For
matters of compensations, promotion, and tenure, inside counsel are ordinarily subject
to the same administrative personnel supervision as other company employees. These
personnel arrangements differ from the traditional scenario of the self-employed attor-
ney representing a client; and these differences are such, we think, that the elements of
client trust and attorney autonomy are less likely to be implicated in the employer-
employee aspect of in-house counsel status.
Id. at 502.
164. Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 218-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
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in-house counsel on public policy grounds, 165 while the court in
Mourad went as far as finding that a just cause contract had been
formed.1 66 Finally, the Nordling court stated that the attorney-client
relationship did not prohibit an attorney from bringing a retaliatory
discharge suit based upon an implied contract theory. 67 Thus, Gen-
eral Dynamics was not a radical departure from the Balla line of cases
which refused to extend the retaliatory discharge cause of action to in-
house counsel. Rather it was merely the last step in a series of cases
which provided a retaliatory discharge cause of action for in-house
counsel.
e. General Dynamics Corporation v. Superior Court
The California Supreme Court in General Dynamics Corp. v. Supe-
rior Court168 allowed former in-house counsel, Andrew Rose, to sue
his employer, General Dynamics Corporation, for wrongful discharge
under California tort law provided the discharge was premised on
Rose's adherence to mandatory professional duties or his refusal to
violate legal or ethical rules which protect the public interest.169 Rose
had worked for General Dynamics as an attorney since 1978.17 On
June 24, 1991, Rose was fired for,171 according to General Dynamics, a
loss of the company's confidence in his ability to vigorously represent
General Dynamics' interests. 72 Rose contended that the "real" rea-
sons for his discharge had to do with an attempt by company officials
to cover up widespread drug use among the General Dynamics
workforce,173 a refusal by General Dynamics to investigate the bug-
ging of the office of the company's chief of security,174 and the dis-
pleasure of company officials with legal advice Rose gave concerning
several hundred million dollars in back pay claims which General Dy-
namics allegedly owed its employees.' 75 The complaint relied on two
165. Klages v. Sperry Corp., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2463, 2469 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1984).
166. Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
167. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502.
168. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
169. Id. at 490.
170. Id. Rose began working as a 27-year-old contract administrator at General Dynamics'
Pomona plant. Id. During the 14 years Rose was employed at General Dynamics he climbed the
corporate ladder earning repeated commendations, until he was in line to become a division
vice-president and general counsel. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. An investigation at the Pomona plant led to the termination of more than 60 Gen-
eral Dynamics employees. Id. at 490-91.
174. Id. at 491. The alleged bugging of offices could be a criminal offense and a serious breach
of national security since it involved a major defense contractor. Id.
175. Id.
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different theories of relief. First, General Dynamics, through its con-
duct and other assurances, had impliedly represented to Rose over the
years that he was subject to discharge only for "good cause. ' 176 Sec-
ond, Rose was in fact fired for cumulative reasons, all of which vio-
lated fundamental public policies. 77
The California Supreme Court granted review to consider the issue
of whether an attorney's status as in-house counsel precludes a cause
of action for damages following an allegedly wrongful discharge. 178
General Dynamics relied upon Fracasse v. Brent,179 a case in which
the California Supreme Court granted the client an absolute right to
discharge a lawyer at any time for any reason. 80 General Dynamics
argued that, based upon Fracasse, Rose had no cause of action for
retaliatory discharge since he was an attorney.' 81 While the supreme
court in General Dynamics reaffirmed the rule in Fracasse, the court
qualified that Fracasse only granted an "absolute" right to discharge
their attorney for any or no cause to personal injury clients.' 82 The
176. Id.
177. Id. "General dynamics filed a general demurrer to the complaint, asserting that Rose
failed to state a claim for relief." Id. Because Rose had been employed as an in-house counsel,
the company contended, he was subject to discharge at any time, "for any reason or for no
reason." Id. "The trial court overruled the demurrer and the Court of Appeal denied General
Dynamics' ensuing petition for a writ of mandate, ruling that, at least at the pleading stage, the
complaint was sufficient to survive a general demurrer as to both theories of relief." Id.
178. Id. at 489. The court recognized a change in the times resulting from a growth in the
number and role of in-house counsel which triggered a change in the character and role of the
lawyer's place in society-contrasted with the 19th Century image which was "based predomi-
nantly on the small- to mid-size firm of like minded attorneys whose economic fortunes were not
tethered to the good will of a single client." Id. at 491. No longer is the relationship between an
attorney and his client a "one-shot" deal-characteristic of traditional law firms. Id. Rather, in-
house counsel conduct business under heavily regulated conditions, often taking "on a larger
advisory and compliance role, anticipating potential legal problems, advising on possible solu-
tions, and generally assisting the corporation in achieving its business aims while minimizing
entanglement in the increasingly complex legal web that regulates organizational conduct in our
society." Id. In-house counsel have to deal with the pressures to conform with organizational
goals, while adhering to the dictates of the lawyer's professional code of responsibility. Id. at
492.
179. 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972). In Fracasse, an attorney represented a woman in a personal injury
lawsuit under a contingent fee arrangement. Id. The client discharged the attorney in favor of
new counsel. Id. The former attorney claimed that he had been discharged without just cause
and sought a declaratory judgment to recover his one-third contingency fee-a percentage of the
final recovery by his former client. Id. The court held that "a client should have both the power
and the right at any time to discharge his attorney with or without cause." Id. The court pre-
mised its holding on the belief that no client should be forced to have an attorney represent them
when they have lost confidence and trust in their attorney, because confidence and trust lie at
the heart of the fiduciary relationship. Id.
180. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 492.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 493. The court added that "[i]f, as a matter of legal doctrine, the client's right to
discharge can be invoked without consequence in all circumstances, it might easily produce un-
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supreme court in General Dynamics differentiated between the
sources of contract and tort claims in wrongful discharge cases, con-
cluding that these claims are analytically different from the circum-
stances that are faced by the contingent fee plaintiff, which the court
had to address in Fracasse v. Brent.183
Rose's complaint did not contest General Dynamics's right to dis-
charge employees of its corporation. Instead, he claimed that there is
a cost to be paid for such action. 184 The court acknowledged that
under certain circumstances, an in-house counsel may pursue a wrong-
ful discharge claim for damages, despite the fact that reinstatement is
not an available remedy.' 85 The court found that, in terminating
Rose, General Dynamics had breached an implied-in-fact contract. 86
The court held that Rose was hired by General Dynamics as a "career
oriented" employee with an expectation of permanent employment,
provided Rose performed satisfactory; "that he was promised job se-
curity and substantial retirement benefits; that he regularly received
outstanding performance reviews, promotions, salary increases, and
commendations throughout his 14-year tenure; and that the company
abruptly terminated him without adhering to its published discharge
procedures.' 1 87 These facts suggest that General Dynamics had cre-
ated a reasonable expectation through its conduct and various oral
representations that Rose would only be terminated with just cause.' 88
Thus, while General Dynamics has the right to terminate any of its in-
house counsel in which it has lost confidence, it may not do so "with-
out honoring antecedent contractual obligations to discharge an attor-
ney-employee only on the occurrence of specified conditions."'' 89
conscionable results." Id. at 494. For example, an attorney in New York contracts to work for a
corporation in Los Angeles, and thus he moves his entire family to California. Id. Three months
later, he is summarily discharged. Id. The court stated in General Dynamics that "[t]o insist in
the face of such egregious circumstances that our opinion in Fracasse ... immunizes the em-
ployer by providing an 'absolute' right to discharge with complete impunity.., would compel us
to embrace as intuitively unjust, even outrageous, result ..... Id.
183. Id. at 495.
184. Id. When a retaliatory discharge claim on an implied contract is based on public policy
grounds the cost to the defendant should be lost wages and other related damages. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 495-97. Implied-in-fact contract claims work as a limitation on an employer's tradi-
tional power to terminate its employees at-will. Id. at 495.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 496. The California Supreme Court felt that the Minnesota Supreme Court sum-
marized the situation best when it stated:
The fact remains ... that the in-house attorney is also a company employee, as we see
no reason to deny the job security aspects of the employer-employee relationship if
this can be done without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship.
For matters of compensation, promotion and tenure, inside counsel are ordinarily sub-
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The court next looked at Rose's claim that his discharge violated
public policy.19o In order to contest a wrongful discharge on public
policy grounds, Rose needed to establish that his discharge violated a
" 'fundamental policy that [is] delineated in constitutional or statutory
provisions' of the law of this state."'191 The court's decision attempted
to accommodate two conflicting values: the fiduciary duty of the at-
torney to the client and the duty of the attorney to adhere to profes-
sional ethical norms. 192 The court recognized that there is a strong
counter-argument against allowing retaliatory discharge claims by in-
house counsel. 93 However, the California Supreme Court did not be-
ject to the same administrative personnel supervision as other company employees.
These personnel arrangements differ from the traditional scenario of the self-employed
attorney representing a client; and these differences are such, we think, that the ele-
ments of client trust and attorney autonomy are less likely to be implicated in the em-
ployer-employee aspect of the in-house counsel status.
Id. The California Supreme Court acknowledged that the corporation has wide latitude in deter-
mining when the corporation has just and good cause to discharge an in-house counsel. Id. See,
e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 743 (1988) (affirming dismissal of an action by
a marketing manager for wrongful termination); Fowler v. Varian Assoc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 34
(1987) (affirming the dismissal of an employee's action for wrongful discharge); cf. Santa Clara
County Attys. Assn. v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142 (Cal. 1994) (holding that the county was barred
from discharging attorneys for exercising their right to sue under a statute).
190. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 496.
191. Id. (quoting Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 688 (Cal. 1992)). In California, the first
requirement of a public policy claim is that the policy "at issue must be one that is not only
'fundamental' but is clearly established in the Constitution and positive law of the state." Id. at
497 (citing Gantt, 824 P.2d at 688). Second, the "policy subserved by the employee's conduct
must be a truly public one, that is, 'affecting a duty which inures to the benefit of the public at
large rather than to a particular employer or employee.'" Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988)). Finally, "decisions recognizing a tort action for discharge in
violation of public policy seek to protect the public, by protecting the employee who refuses to
commit a crime... reports criminal activity to proper authorities or who discloses other illegal,
unethical, or unsafe practices." Id. (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal.
1988)).
192. Id. at 498. A genuine moral dilemma may develop out of the competing interests faced
by in-house counsel. Id. This is often the case when dealing with large corporations whose
primary objective is a desire to maximize profits. Id. This may place in-house counsel in the
position to decide between furthering the goals of their employer, the corporation, and following
the restrictions placed on their conduct by the professional code of ethics. Id. Though these
pressures exist for outside attorneys, the pressures are more acute for the in-house counsel who
are in the situation of "virtually complete dependence on the good will and confidence of a
single employer to provide livelihood and career success." Id.
193. Id. The court acknowledged that a majority of courts have declined to recognize a cause
of action for retaliatory discharge in the context of in-house counsel because it would constitute
too great a threat to the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 498-500; see supra notes 94-126, 67-
75, and 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Balla, Herbster, and Willy decisions, respec-
tively). The California Supreme Court's view of these cases which decline to extend a cause of
action is that:
If their reasoning and conclusions can be faulted, it is because one searches in vain for a
principled link between the ethical duties of the in-house attorney and the courts' re-
fusal to grant such an employee a tort remedy under conditions that directly implicate
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lieve that these countervailing factors outweighed the need for a lim-
ited rule in which discharged in-house counsel had a cause of action
for wrongful discharge. 194
The Supreme Court of California devised a test to determine when
an in-house counsel has a retaliatory discharge claim against his or her
employer. First, the court must "ask whether the attorney was dis-
charged for following a mandatory ethical obligation prescribed by
professional rule or statute."195 Under most circumstances, if the an-
swer is yes, then the attorney will have a retaliatory discharge action
against the employer.1 96 Second, "if, on the other hand, the conduct
which the attorney has engaged is merely ethically permissible, but
not required by statute or ethical code, then the court must apply a
two-pronged test. ' 197 The court must first determine whether the em-
ployer's conduct would give rise to a retaliatory discharge action by a
non-attorney employee under Gantt v. Sentry Insurance and related
cases.' 98 Thus, the plaintiff must show that the discharge violated a
"fundamental policy that is delineated in constitutional or statutory"
provisions of the law of this state.1 99 If the facts would give rise to
such a cause of action, then the court must determine if there is some
statute or ethical rule which permits an attorney to engage in the
"nonfiduciary" conduct which was the ultimate reason for the
discharge.200
those professional obligations. As more than one critic of these opinions has pointed
out, both cases appear to reflect not only an unspoken adherence to anachronistic
model of the attorney's place in contemporary society, but an inverted view of the
consequences of the in-house counsel's essential professional role.
General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 500. Also, the court points to the fact that there would have
clearly been a cause of action had this case involved a non-lawyer employee of General Dynam-
ics. Id. The court has rejected the remedy of withdrawal (quitting one's job) because nonlawyer
employees are not asked to quietly surrender their positions, rather society should encourage
and give support to those who try to expose unlawful activity. Id. at 502. The remedy of with-
drawal does not confront the high costs which follow resignation and, in failing to provide a
remedy, the professional stature of in-house counsel will be lessened. Id.
194. Id. at 502-05.
195. Id. at 502. For example, if an in-house counsel was asked to commit a crime or act that
would subject him to disbarment and was then discharged because the in-house counsel refused
to engage in such conduct, the attorney would have been fired for adhering to mandatory ethical
obligations. Id. Thus, the attorney would have a cause of action against his employer for retalia-
tory discharge. Id. at 502-03.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 503.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 496.
200. Id. at 503. For example, if the in-house counsel is acting under a statutory exception to
the attorney-client privilege which specifically permits the attorney to breach the rule of confi-
dentiality owed to the client the attorney would be permitted to engage in the "non-fiduciary"
conduct. Id.
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The court emphasized the limited scope of this rule because "[t]he
lawyer's high duty of fidelity to the interests of the client work [sic]
against a tort remedy that is coextensive with that available to the
nonattorney employee."'201 The court held that there is no reason in-
herent in the nature of an attorney's role as in-house counsel that pre-
cludes the maintenance of a retaliatory discharge claim, provided that
it can be established without breaching the attorney-client privilege or
unduly endangering the values lying at the heart of the professional
relationship. 2 2 In General Dynamics, Rose never alleged that the
conduct which led to his discharge was required or supported by any
required rules of professional conduct or any relevant state statute.20 3
Therefore, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court and
Rose was permitted to amend his complaint against General Dynam-
ics in accordance with the decision set forth by the court.2°4
The Supreme Court of California, in General Dynamics Corp. v. Su-
perior Court, created a limited exception to the traditional at-will em-
ployment doctrine for in-house counsel. The General Dynamics test
attempts to protect attorney-client privilege and confidentiality, while
at the same time protecting the interests of the in-house counsel.
Thus, the court in General Dynamics held that justice and equity allow
a wrongfully discharged in-house counsel to maintain a retaliatory dis-
charge cause of action. 205
D. Attorneys Treated as Lay Employees
A final approach to retaliatory discharge of in-house counsel has
been to treat the attorney as a lay employee. In Meredith v. C.E.
Walther, Inc. ,206 the plaintiff was fired after he gave deposition testi-
mony concerning trust assets that the corporate employer allegedly
had misappropriated.207 The court treated the discharged attorney as
201. Id.
202. Id. at 503-05. The court makes three points concerning its holding. First, those in-house
counsel who publicly expose their corporations secrets will only be protected in those instances
where disclosure is explicitly mandated or allowed by an ethics code provision or statute. Id. at
503. Second, "the statutory attorney-client privilege should continue to be strictly observed. We
reject any suggestion that the scope of the privilege should be diluted in the context of in-house
counsel and their corporate clients." Id. at 504. Finally, the corporation may always produce
evidence that the discharge was not retaliatory, thereby proving that the discharge was not
wrongful. Id. at 505.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 422 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1982).
207. Id. at 762. A lawsuit had been commenced against C.E. Walther, Inc. alleging that they
converted trust assets. Id. Plaintiff, who was employed as in-house attorney, testified in a depo-
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a regular employee because he was fired for something unrelated to
his role as in-house counsel. 208 However, the court held that the
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for wrongful discharge of an
at-will employee. 209 As seen in Meredith, courts may disregard an in-
house counsel's status as an attorney and apply traditional discharge
analysis, when an attorney's discharge is for conduct which is unre-
lated to the scope of the in-house counsel's role as an attorney.210
II. ANALYSIS
The judicially created doctrine of at-will employment has been in a
state of evolution during the twentieth century.21' The retaliatory dis-
charge exception to the at-will rule allows an employee to recover
damages from his employer when he or she is discharged "in contra-
vention of a clearly mandated public policy. ' 212 The recent develop-
ment of retaliatory discharge suits has raised a question which other
jurisdictions will need to address: Should a cause of action for retalia-
tory discharge exist for in-house counsel? From this simple question,
many strong arguments have been made both for and against an ex-
tension of the tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel.
Some courts and critics are reluctant to extend the privilege of retal-
iatory discharge to in-house counsel because of the potential "chilling
effect" on communications between attorneys and clients which could
have a detrimental effect on the attorney-client relationship.2 13 In
sition concerning the converted trust. Id. As a result of plaintiff's actions the corporation termi-
nated plaintiff's employment. Id.
208. Id. at 761-62.
209. Id. at 762. The plaintiff argued that the court should abandon the employment at will
rule and recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Id. Although the court acknowl-
edged that the plaintiff asserted legitimate reasons, such as the policy reasons asserted in
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959),
the court found that the plaintiff's case did not come within the theory which he was asserting.
Meredith, 422 So. 2d at 763. Nowhere in plaintiff's complaint or trial does he allege that the
defendants asked him to commit perjury, violate any disciplinary rules applicable to attorneys, or
commit some similar transgression. Id. Rather, plaintiff merely alleges that he was fired because
he testified truthfully and became a party to the lawsuit. Id.
210. Gensler, supra note 14, at 524; see also Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge without ever
addressing plaintiff's status as in-house counsel). Contra Herbster v. North American Co., 501
N.E.2d 343, 346 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) ("[W]e cannot separate plaintiff's role as an employee from
his profession.").
211. See supra notes 7-30 and accompanying text (discussing the general history of at-will
employment and retaliatory discharge).
212. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (I11. 1981).
213. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110-11 (11. 1991). The court fears that an exten-
sion of the retaliatory discharge cause of action to in-house counsel may harm the at-will nature
of the attorney-client relationship which purportedly promotes mutual trust and free communi-
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contrast, other courts and commentators are willing to expand the re-
taliatory discharge cause of action to include in-house counsel.214 The
answer depends on whether the courts and commentators focus on the
detrimental effects to the in-house counsel or upon sanctity of the at-
torney-client relationship. The goal of both sides is to preserve and
encourage the pursuit of ethical conduct.
A. Conflict Between Fiduciary Duty Owed to One's Client and the
Ethical Responsibilities of an Attorney
A lawyer has to stand "as a shield ... in defense of right and to
ward off wrong."215 No one ever said this would be an easy task. The
practice of law is an honored profession, in part because of the fiduci-
ary duties owed to one's client, and in part because of the professional
code of conduct which guide an attorney's conduct.216 The attorney
must serve as an advocate for his client as well as a confidential advi-
sor.217 Under certain circumstances the attorney may be confronted
with the dilemma of choosing between the fiduciary duties owed to
the client and the ethical obligations which an attorney must follow on
account of his or her status as an attorney.
cations between attorneys and clients. Id. at 110. The same fears were voiced earlier in Herbster
v. North American Co., 501 N.E.2d 343 (I11. App. Ct. 1986); see also Gensler, supra note 14, at
536-52 (discussing the detrimental effects of extending a retaliatory discharge cause of action to
in-house counsel).
214. See supra notes 127-205 and accompanying text (discussing decisions which have ex-
tended a wrongful discharge cause of action to in-house counsel). Several reasons exist for the
abandonment of the employment at-will rule. First, the "American industry is no longer so
delicate that its survival necessitates the subversion of employee rights." O'Dell, supra note 34,
at 576; see also Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 509 (N.J. 1980) (discussing
the origins of the at-will doctrine); William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100
Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201, 204-05 (1985). Mauk stated that
Many of the circumstances which might have justified the at-will rule in the past no
longer exist. The opportunity for self employment in America has steadily declined.
Ninety percent of our work force can be classified as wage or salary earners. We have
become a nation of employees dependent upon others for almost all of our income ....
During the last fifty years, the ability of employees to make employment changes has
decreased, particularly when the job seeker is old or has only been employed by a
single employer for many years.
Id. Second, every other major industrial nation has recognized the need to protect employees
from unjust dismissal in order to preserve and promote industrial progress and has adopted
either a judicial mechanism or a statute that protects workers form wrongful discharge. Id. at
204. Third, another basis for criticizing the employment-at-will rule is the decline of job mobility
among workers. O'Dell, supra note 34, at 577; Summers, supra note 8, at 513.
215. Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
216. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr (1992). See supra notes 53-63 and accompa-
nying text (outlining a few of the ethics guidelines that attorneys are obligated to follow).
217. Hazard, Jr., supra note 48, at 1061.
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1. The Problem of Competing Interests
What should an attorney do, for example, when he becomes aware
of widespread drug use in his client's corporation?; 218 when his re-
quest to investigate the potential illegality of bugging company em-
ployees is ignored?; 219 when he becomes aware of potentially several
hundred million dollars in back pay claims which might be owed to his
client's employees?; 220 when he learns that his client may be selling
defective products which could endanger the lives of many people? 221
If the business of lawyers is to represent their clients, one would think
that the lawyer ought to carry out their clients' wishes. Such a pre-
sumption assumes that the client's needs or requests are legal and eth-
ical. In situations such as these the fiduciary duties owed to the client
will often conflict with the ethical obligations of an attorney enumer-
ated in the professional code of conduct.
The professional codes of conduct, such as the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, provide some guidance for attorneys when decid-
ing how to conduct their legal practice. According to Rule 1.2 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a
lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or appli-
cation of the law.
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not per-
mitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer
shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the
lawyer's conduct.222
Since attorneys are expected to act with the utmost of moral charac-
ter, attorneys have only one option: to do that which is legal.2 23
Therefore, the attorney's ethical responsibility is to advise his or her
corporate employers of the illegality of their proposed course of con-
duct. If these corporate employers refuse to accept the in-house coun-
sel's advice and proceed with the illegal conduct, the in-house counsel
is required to withdraw from any connection with the unethical or ille-
gal conduct because the in-house counsel cannot knowingly assist a
218. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 491.
221. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 106 (I11. 1991).
222. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2 (1992).
223. Id. Rule 1.2 discusses the scope of representation and states that an attorney shall not
counsel a client to engage in, or assist a client in violating a law, but may discuss the conse-
quences of any proposed conduct. Id.
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client in criminal or fraudulent conduct.224 The attorney must with-
draw from representation if the corporation insists on the attorney's
involvement in any attempt by the corporation: to cover up wide-
spread drug use among a client corporation's workforce; to bug the
corporation's employees offices; to cover-up potential back pay owed
to the corporation's employees. Furthermore, the attorney must with-
draw and report to the proper authorities any knowledge about the
sale of defective products which will endanger the lives of innocent
people.225 Where the price is lost faith in the legal system, upholding
the integrity of the profession of law and the judicial process must
always be the quintessential goal of every attorney.
In the best of all worlds the client would respect the attorney's ethi-
cal obligations. In the competitive business world of the twentieth
century, however, the stark reality is that for many of those attorneys
who refuse to either break the law or to violate the professional code
of ethics, the client will simply seek other counsel who are more will-
ing to carry out the corporation's wishes while overlooking their own
ethical obligations. Such an outcome is particularly shattering to the
in-house counsel who only represents one client.226 Unfortunately,
termination of employment for in-house counsel in today's competi-
tive job market can have devastating effects on one's chances of gain-
ing future employment, as well as being a permanent mark on one's
employment record.227
The position of in-house counsel is qualitatively different from that
of an attorney in private practice. First, the in-house counsel is an
employee of the corporation. On account of the pervasive control
which the corporation has over the in-house counsel the counsel pos-
224. According to Rule 1.16 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Declining or
Terminating Representation, "a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law." MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1992).
225. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 and 1.16 (1992). Rule
1.16(a)(1) requires an attorney to withdraw if continued representation will result in a violation
of the Model Rules or the law. Id. Rule 1.16. While Rule 1.6 permits a lawyer to reveal confi-
dential client information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to "prevent the
client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm." Id. Rule 1.6.
226. O'Dell, supra note 34, at 574. Withdrawal for an lawyer in private practice is not only
required but it is a reasonable alternative. Id. On the other hand, for attorneys who represent
only one client, such as in-house counsel, withdrawal means the loss of one's entire livelihood.
Id. Thus, the in-house counsel is faced with a much more difficult set of circumstances than
attorneys in private practice. Id.
227. Id. at 577. Stakes are high for wage earners: "today, if a worker loses his job, he loses
almost every resource except social welfare relief." Id.
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sess nearly all the same characteristics of the ordinary at-will em-
ployee.228 In-house counsel are subject to corporation policy, -they
have supervisors, and their employment and advancement is subject
to review by corporate executives. As Sara Corello argued, in her ar-
ticle, "In-House Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge,"
in-house counsel are completely dependent upon the corporation for
their entire income, benefits and pension.229 Thus, when a difficult
ethical decision arises, in-house counsel are just as tempted as other
employees "to either ignore or rationalize away their ethical obliga-
tions when complying therewith may render them unable to feed and
support their families. ' 230 Although there is no justification for an
attorney failing to honor his or her ethical duties, the court should
remedy the harm inflicted upon an in-house counsel who was dis-
charged in retaliation for acting in an ethical and legal fashion. Such a
result in no way prohibits a corporation from discharging its in-house
counsel, but merely provides that under certain circumstances there
may be a cost to such a decision. Allowing a right of recovery for
retaliatory discharge would encourage in-house counsel to conduct
themselves ethically under all circumstances because the fear of being
fired will not be as harsh, nor carry with it such devastating
consequences. 231
B. The Conflicting Approaches to Retaliatory Discharge Suits by
In-House Counsel
Until General Dynamics v. Superior Court,232 the leading case ad-
dressing the issue of retaliatory discharge of in-house counsel was
Balla v. Gambro, Inc. 233 A number of jurisdictions, such as Texas and
Pennsylvania, followed Balla in rejecting a cause of action for retalia-
228. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the role of in-house counsel).
229. See Corello, supra note 8, at 405 (discussing in-house counsel relationship with the
corporation).
230. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (1991) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
231. According to Michael L. Closen and Mark E. Wojick, extending a cause of acti6n for
retaliatory discharge would encourage the ethical behavior of corporate counsel by protecting
honest attorneys, while punishing dishonest corporations. Michael L. Closen & Mark E. Wojick,
Lawyers Out in the Cold, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1987, at 96. Closen and Wojick said: "If an employee
tells his lawyer to do something unlawful, the lawyer should be encouraged... to refuse to do so.
If the employer persists, [the employer is] willfully trying to break the law and should not be
insulated from a retaliation-discharge suit if he fires the honest lawyer." Id. Thus, no purpose is
served by shielding employers from tort liability, while "permitting actions for retaliatory dis-
charge would protect those lawyers who comply with professional rules of conduct and other
statements of clearly mandated public policy." Kobus, Jr., supra note 20, at 1390-91.
232. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
233. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
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tory discharge of in-house counsel based on public policy.234 The
General Dynamics decision, which upheld a retaliatory discharge
cause of action for in-house counsel-based upon an implied contract
theory and public policy grounds-creates a confrontation for future
courts: Whether or not a retaliatory discharge cause of action should
exist for in-house counsel.
1. Acceptance of a Cause of Action?
The at-will nature of the attorney-client relationship supposedly
promotes mutual trust and free communications between attorneys
and their clients.235 Courts in the interest of justice have recognized in
limited circumstances a public policy exception to the at-will employ-
ment rule when an employee is discharged in contravention of a
clearly mandated public policy.236 Should courts include retaliatory
discharge of in-house counsel among those limited circumstances in
which a cause of action exists?
a. No Cause of Action for In-house Counsel
The two most common reasons given by courts for not extending
the retaliatory discharge cause of action to in-house counsel are: (1)
the traditional at-will employment nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship, and; (2) the perceived adverse effect on the attorney-client
relationship.237 These courts have supported the at-will nature of the
attorney-client employment relationship by reasoning that if courts
were to allow such retaliatory discharge actions the confidential na-
ture of the attorney-client relationship would be impaired. 238 The
courts hold that lawyers do not have a choice between committing
illegal or unethical acts, since they are under a duty to follow the code
of professional responsibility. 239 And when lawyers are presented
234. For a discussion of cases rejecting wrongful termination claims brought by in-house coun-
sel, see McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Willy v. Coastal
Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
235. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ill. 1991).
236. Id. at 104; see also Herbster v. North American Co. for Life and Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d
343 (I1. App. Ct. 1991) (recognizing a limited exception to the at-will employment rule).
237. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109; see also McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 887 (refusing to recognize a
claim for wrongful termination by in-house counsel). Also, corporations are concerned "that
erosion of the at-will doctrine will disrupt business efficiency and flexibility, will invite frivolous
lawsuits, and saddle employers with mediocre or unqualified workers." Mauk, supra note 226,
at 206.
238. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing the adverse effects an exten-
sion of the wrongful discharge cause of action will have on the attorney-client relationship).
239. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the duty imposed by the profes-
sional code of ethics).
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with such ethical conflicts the attorney has the obligation to withdraw
from representation. 240
The strength of finding no-cause of action for wrongfully discharged
attorneys is the existence of a bright line rule. Courts would be able
to conclude that under all circumstances an attorney's retaliatory dis-
missal is without remedy. Secondly, by providing no cause of action,
the courts are protecting the strongly recognized goal that "sound
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or
advocacy depends upon the lawyer [sic] being fully informed by the
client. 2 41 Thus, most importantly the integrity of the judicial process
would be preserved by disallowing a cause of action to in-house coun-
sel-but at what cost?
The problem with the Balla line of reasoning is that the courts have
over-simplified their response by merely focusing on the in-house
counsel's status as an attorney, rather than critically examining the
nature and role of the in-house counsel. 242 The role of the attorney
has shifted with the growth of corporations and their drive to bring
legal counsel in-house. 243 In-house counsel are in many respects more
similar to employees than they are to private practice attorneys.
However, these in-house attorneys are not allowed a cause of action
for an alleged retaliatory discharge, even though an employee of the
corporation in the same situation would have a cause of action.244
Withdrawal does not become a viable option if the attorney is faced
with the prospect of prolonged unemployment, termination of bene-
fits and a permanently blemished employment record. Courts which
choose to follow Balla have decided that in some cases attorneys must
forego monetary gain in order to uphold the legal profession. 245 The
Balla court noted that one commentator has criticized the "no cause
of action" line of decisions by stating that, "[i]t is clear that there
would have been a right of action had the employee not been a law-
yer. It thus seems bizarre that a lawyer-employee, who has affirma-
tive duties concerning the administration of justice, should be denied
redress for discharge resulting from trying to carry out those very
duties." 246
240. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation of withdrawal).
241. UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
242. See supra note 65-126 and accompanying text (discussing the Balla line of cases).
243. See supra note 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing use by corpora-
tions of in-house counsel).
244. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining the similarities between in-house
counsel and non-attorney corporate employees).
245. See supra note 127 (discussing Balla v. Gambro and its reasoning).
246. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 500-01 (Cal. 1994).
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The reality is that when an in-house counsel is wrongfully dis-
charged, that attorney is without income or benefits for upholding the
integrity of the legal profession, while the corporation goes unpun-
ished. Finding solace in the fact that the integrity of the profession
has been protected is not enough to overcome the injustice which has
occurred. The reality is that unethical employers are receiving the
protection of the law when courts fail to extend a claim for retaliatory
discharge to a wrongfully terminated in-house counsel.
b. A Cause of Action for In-House Counsel
A number of approaches have been offered to support a retaliatory
discharge cause of action for in-house counsel. One option is to treat
attorneys, such as in-house counsel, as lay-employees when the con-
duct which the discharge was based upon is unrelated to the in-house
counsel's duties as an attorney.247 Such an option allows the courts to
apply traditional at-will employment analysis. Two problems may
arise from such an approach. First, application of such an approach is
of limited scope because most often in-house counsel are discharged
for conduct within the scope of their employment as in-house coun-
sel-providing legal advice. Second, separating one's duties as a lay
employee from those duties performed as an attorney creates a tenu-
ous and difficult task for the judiciary. Therefore, in order to best
promote the interest of upholding the integrity of the judicial process,
courts should create for in-house their own exception to traditional at-
will employment doctrine.
In response to the need for justice in this area of the law, courts
have fashioned a remedy for in-house counsel who are wrongfully dis-
charged in retaliation for refusal to commit illegal or unethical con-
duct.248 The General Dynamics decision is narrowly drawn and
recognizes that under certain circumstances, an in-house counsel may
have a retaliatory discharge cause of action.249 The court announced
two such limited circumstances: First, if the court finds that an im-
247. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text (discussing Meredith v. C.E. Walther,
Inc., 420 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1982)).
248. See supra notes 127-205 and accompanying text (discussing decisions that have upheld a
cause of action for wrongful discharge). Supporters argue that extending retaliatory discharge
lawsuits to in-house counsel serves two functions: First, the corporation can not coerce employ-
ees into committing criminal or unethical acts without sanction. Abramson, supra note 45, at
278. Secondly, courts discourage lawyers from becoming "pawns in effectuating obstructions of
justice" by the corporation. Id.
249. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502-05; see supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text
(discussing the test established by the California Supreme Court to be applied to an alleged
retaliatory discharge of in-house counsel).
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plied contract existed which provided that termination would be for
just cause, then the in-house counsel will have a cause of action;250
second, if the court holds that the corporations actions violated public
policy, then a cause of action for retaliatory discharge exists if the
plaintiff can meet the requirements set forth in General Dynamics.251
The court's conclusion in General Dynamics to extend the retalia-
tory discharge cause of action to in-house counsel is a promising step
towards encouraging and promoting the moral character of attorneys.
If there is a weakness in the General Dynamics decision, it lies in
those situations where the public policy has not been clearly articu-
lated because there is no bright line rule against which employers may
gauge their conduct. 252 However, this same problem would arise in
the case of retaliatory discharge of non-attorney employees, and the
argument should have no greater weight in the case of in-house
counsel.
The court in General Dynamics based its decision on a number of
considerations. First, the General Dynamics decision does not prevent
corporations from discharging in-house counsel. Corporations will
simply have to pay a price when the discharge is retaliatory. Second,
the decision takes into consideration the special position which in-
house counsel have assumed in the business and legal communities,
while addressing the fact that withdrawal is not always a viable option
for in-house counsel.253 Third, compensation would encourage ethical
behavior while supporting the unemployed counsel during his search
for other employment. Fourth, and possibly most importantly, the
overriding goal of upholding the integrity of the judicial process is not
harmed in any way by the General Dynamics decision because private
250. Id. at 495-97; see supra note 184-89 and accompanying text (discussing implied
contracts).
251. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 496-98. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text
(discussing the public policy exception to wrongful discharge). The California Supreme Court
devised a two-part test: First, the court must "ask whether the attorney was discharged for fol-
lowing a mandatory ethical obligation prescribed by professional rule or statute." If so, then a
cause of action exists. However, if the attorney's conduct is "merely ethically permissible, but
not required by statute or ethical code," then the court must ask whether the employer's conduct
would give rise to a retaliatory discharge claim by a non-attorney employee, and "whether some
statute of ethical rule, such as the statutory exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, specifi-
cally permits the attorney to depart from the usual requirement of confidentiality with respect to
the client-employee and engage in the 'nonfiduciary' conduct for which he was terminated."
General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502-05.
252. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy issue in the con-
text of General Dynamics). Public policy is a pure creature of law, thus unless a court has an-
nounced a policy which is delineated from the law of the state no policy exists. General
Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 496.
253. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation of withdrawal).
[Vol. 45:859
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
communications which relate to the criminal or fraudulent conduct
fall within the exception created by the rules of professional conduct
while all other communications remain protected.254 Further, the cor-
poration maintains the power to discharge and when accused of
wrongful discharge, the corporation can still defend its action by pro-
ducing evidence in its defense. Finally, the decision is sufficiently lim-
ited to situations in which an implied contract for just cause dismissal
was found or the discharge violated public policy, thereby permitting a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge of in-house counsel serves jus-
tice to all injured parties and to the public as a whole.255
III. CONCLUSION
The retaliatory discharge cause of action has gained acceptance in
the twentieth century in response to a perceived need by the courts to
fashion a remedy for discharged employees. Courts and legislatures
since the 1950's have allowed suits that restrict an employer's ability
to discharge its employees. Although courts are reluctant to extend a
cause of action to attorneys, the time has come for a limited exception
which would allow in-house counsel the opportunity to seek a remedy
for retaliatory discharge. The nature of the in-house counsel in the
modern business world is such that the position of in-house counsel is
more analogous to that of a lay-employee than to the private practice
attorney. Therefore, the same principles should apply to an in-house
counsel as apply to a lay employee. The attorney-client relationship is
not harmed by an extension of the cause of action because the codes
of professional conduct provide exceptions to the attorney-client priv-
ilege and confidentiality for criminal and fraudulent conduct.
The cause of action would enable attorneys to conduct themselves
in an ethical manner, while protecting their professional career and
financial security. Thus, the attorney will still be able to stand as a
shield in defense of right and a sword against wrong. In the end, an
attorney should not be left without any remedy at law because he lost
his job when his ethical duties as an attorney conflicted with his fiduci-
ary duties to the client.
Michael P. Sheehan
254. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 (1992).
255. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text (discussing the test formulated in Gen.
eral Dynamics).
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